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Abstract 
 This thesis examines how Japan internalizes international Indigenous rights norms. The 
application of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) in Japan relating to 
Ainu Indigenous rights provides a narrow case study for my analysis. On July 6, 2008, the 
Japanese government recognized the Ainu as Indigenous. Utilizing the five-phase spiral model, I 
find that the DRIP acted as an impetus for change within the context of Indigenous rights in Japan. 
In the first section of this thesis, I describe the current international development of Indigenous 
rights norms. In doing so, I introduce the spiral model as a constructivist analysis of norm 
internalization. The spiral model provides a nexus between two popular Indigenous law 
perspectives—social movements and the legalist rational model, which provide pressures for 
governmental reform from below and above, respectively. This thesis ultimately demonstrates 
how these pressures cooperated to progress Japan further through the spiral model. The rest of 
this thesis examines the Japan-Ainu case study within the framework of the spiral model. I begin 
my spiral model analysis with Phase 1 (repression and activation of networks) at the end of World 
War II. From there, I systematically pinpoint Japan’s progression through Phase 2 (denial) and 
Phase 3 (tactical concessions). Near the end of Phase 3, I demonstrate how the DRIP assisted 
Japan’s transition into Phase 4 (prescriptive status), where it remains currently. I also discuss what 
changes are necessary to shift Japan into Phase 5 (rule-consistent behavior). In conclusion, I 
determine that cooperative domestic-transnational pressures can use non-binding international 
documents such as the DRIP to bring about moderate change in a state’s Indigenous policies. 
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Introduction 
The Japanese government formally recognized the Ainu as an Indigenous 
population on June 6, 2008.1 This monumental event for the Ainu of Japan took place 
less than one year after the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) by the UN General Assembly. Some legal professionals 
dismiss declarations as an inadequate tool to establish and promote human rights 
because they are considered aspirational and not directly enforceable.2 However, the 
relatively short time between the adoption of the DRIP and the acknowledgment of the 
Ainu’s Indigeneity raises the question whether the DRIP played a role in facilitating this 
change.  
The Ainu are people of the north, distinct from the ethnic Japanese “Wajin” 
from the south.3 Ainu largely occupy the northern island of Japan, Hokkaido. 
Historically, the Ainu also occupied parts of northern Honshu (Japan’s largest island), 
southern Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands; but most present-day populations are located 
solely in Hokkaido. The Ainu faced legal persecution dating back to the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868. For over a century, national regulations encouraged the 
“Japanisation” of Ainu society and culture. These regulations proved themselves 
extremely effective in severing the Ainu from their culture and traditions until the 
                                            
1 Masami Ito, “Diet officially declares Ainu indigenous,” The Japan Times June 7, 2008, accessed April 10, 
2017, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/06/07/national/diet-officially-declares-ainu-
indigenous/#.WKNYwTsrKHu. 
2 Jacob Dolinger, “The Failure of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review, 47:2 no. 4 (2016), 184. 
3 Henry Stewart, “Representation of the Ainu in Textbooks and Museums – Historical and Contemporary 
Ramifications,” in The Ainu: Indigenous People of Japan Vol. 3, ed. Henry Stewart (Sapporo: Hokkaido 
University Center for Ainu and Indigenous Studies, 2012), 5. 
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1990s.4 The late 20th Century witnessed a growing movement of Ainu leaders 
advocating for Ainu rights and recognition of indigeneity, including the election of 
Shigeru Kayano, the first Ainu to sit in the Japanese legislature, the Diet.5 A 1999 
Sapporo District Court ruling in Kayano et al v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee 
(Nibutani Dam Decision) provided an opportunity for change by recognizing the Ainu 
as “a distinct ethnic group.” Under this determination, the Japanese government was 
legally bound to consider protective measures for the Ainu within the meanings of 
Article 13 of its constitution (“All people shall be respected…”) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).6 However, this judicial decision did 
not consider the Ainu to be Indigenous Peoples, and Japan’s legislative and executive 
branches largely ignored further Ainu outcry for recognition until June 2008. 
I seek to answer the following question within this thesis: In what ways has the 
DRIP acted as an impetus for change in Japan’s legal recognition of the Ainu as an 
Indigenous People? Specifically, I wish to understand what developments in Ainu 
Indigenous rights might be attributed to the DRIP since its adoption in 2007. In seeking 
to answer these questions, I do not make the assumption that the DRIP was the most 
significant factor providing the preconditions for recognition of Ainu Indigeneity. 
Rather, through my question, I determine whether the DRIP contributed toward the 
preconditions and pressures necessary for the Japanese government to change its 
                                            
4 Ibid., 6-7. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 Mark Levin, “Kayano et al. v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee: ‘The Nibutani Dam Decision’,” 
International Legal Materials (University of Hawaii at Manoa – William S. Richardson School of Law) 394, 
accessed April 10, 2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1635447. 
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Indigenous policies, despite the presence of Japanese officials who firmly believe the 
state to be homogenous.7  
My research is academically significant because it attempts to further clarify 
how international norms are internalized domestically, specifically the newly emerged 
rights of Indigenous Peoples. The history of Ainu activism domestically and 
internationally illustrates how Indigenous populations can affect international norms. 
Those international norms can then affect how actors perceive and interact with 
Indigenous Peoples. However, the relationship between external influences and 
Japanese state policies are not as straightforward as legal documentations may make it 
seem. The late 20th Century Japanese state has been widely criticized for responding to 
international pressures with the adoption of international laws without instituting 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure positive change.8 In order to accurately identify the 
nature of the DRIP’s influence, my research also looks at the current state of conditions 
for the Ainu nearly a decade after the DRIP’s adoption by the UN General Assembly. 
Japan has far fewer Indigenous populations than other states, but arguably 
contains at least one recognized (Ainu) and unrecognized (Okinawans) Indigenous 
population for comparison. The Ainu are the first and only Indigenous minority 
recognized by the Japanese government, whereas recognition has yet to be extended to 
the Okinawan population in the south. Since fewer Indigenous populations reside within 
the Japanese state than other states that were heavily colonized, such as the U.S. and 
                                            
7 “Ibuki: Japan ‘extremely homogenous’,” The Japan Times, February 26, 2007, accessed April 10, 2017, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/02/26/national/ibuki-japan-extremely-
homogenous/#.WKNYVzsrKHs. 
8 Debito Arudou, “Righting a wrong: United Nations representative’s trip to Japan has caused a stir, The 
Japan Times June 27, 2006, accessed April 10, 2017, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2006/06/27/issues/righting-a-wrong/#.WKNc1DsrKHs. 
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Canada, there are less domestic variables that could contribute to the development of 
Japanese Indigenous rights.9 However, it is important to note that Indigenous Peoples, 
much like states, also have their share of internal debate and disagreements. Multiple 
positions and identifies can be held by individuals that consider themselves 
“Indigenous,” and plenty of other variables can arise that make this analysis much more 
complex than initially presumed, such as the emergence of local Ainu organizations and 
generational differences between younger and elder Ainu individuals.  
This thesis is not an assessment of the general role of international declarations. 
Rather, the focus of this thesis is limited to the DRIP’s impact regarding the Japanese 
government’s recognition of the Ainu as Indigenous People. Additionally, this thesis 
does not claim that the DRIP was the sole, or even most prominent, driving force for 
change in Japanese law for the Ainu community. To claim so would be to ignore 
decades of hardship and efforts by Ainu grassroots activists, and over-emphasize the 
efforts of the outside international communities. This view perpetuates colonialist 
thought by emphasizing an outside community that decided “what’s best” for the 
Indigenous population. Rather, I seek to demonstrate the role the DRIP played in the 
various stages that led to the Ainu’s recognition. I ultimately argue that the DRIP 
coupled with domestic-transnational social networks held a moderate effect on Japanese 
Indigenous law and assisted with the Ainu’s eventual recognition as Indigenous. 
 
 
                                            
9 In comparison, the U.S. currently recognizes 567 Native American tribes, and many treaties/statutes 
further complicate the field of Federal Indian law. (“Frequently Asked Questions,” US Department of the 
Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, last modified February 14, 2017, accessed April 10, 2017, 
http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.) 
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Methodology 
This project utilizes social constructivist theory as the scholarly framework to 
examine Japan’s Indigenous rights policies. Social constructivism, when applied to 
International Relations, emphasizes the role of actors’ interests and preferences in 
relation to the shaping of their identities. Specifically, I rely on the “spiral model” 
created by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink in their book, The 
Power of Human Rights.10 Their framework, the spiral model, was designed to “explain 
the conditions under which international human rights regimes and the principles, 
norms, and rules embedded in them are internalized and implemented domestically.”11 
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink place significant value on the establishment and sustained 
upkeep of social networks between domestic and international actors as a vehicle of 
change for the implementation and internalization of international human rights norms. 
These social networks are crucial for norms to affect state behavior. They serve three 
purposes: (1) as alerts regarding moral consciousness for both liberal and non-liberal 
states, (2) as empowering and legitimizing forces for domestic oppositions, and (3) as a 
challenge to norm-violating governments by transnational structures.12  
The spiral model consists of a number of “boomerang throws,” which are 
patterns of influence where the domestic group bypasses the repressive state to directly 
appeal to international allies. 13 Those international allies then apply outside social 
pressures against the repressive state on behalf of the domestic group. This creates a 
                                            
10 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change (New York, Cambridge Press, 1999), 7. 
11 Ibid., 3. 
12 Ibid., 5. 
13 Ibid., 18. 
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dual-social pressure system, effectively compelling the state “from above” and “from 
below” to bring about the desired change.14 The authors do not present the spiral model 
as an evolutionary process of governmental change. Rather, the spiral model’s five 
different phases offer an explanatory roadmap for how international norms are 
internalized, and where along the process state governments are most likely to withdraw 
from the internalization process.  
Using the spiral model as a guiding conceptual framework, I analyze 
government documents, non-governmental reports, and other secondary sources to 
develop a working understanding of Ainu rights discourse. Many of these documents 
are readily available in English for non-Japanese scholars who wish to research this 
topic further. Many of these resources also entail a brief background of the Ainu since 
knowledge of their existence is still limited outside of Hokkaido. These sources 
therefore also exemplify the breadth to which the Ainu have effectively reached out to 
the international community for support. Prior to the late 20th Century, Indigenous 
rights were viewed as domestic issues addressed by the state. Few international 
influences were present besides the International Bill of Rights and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.15 Since the 1980s, the Ainu have been one of many 
Indigenous groups working alongside the United Nations to initiate change for the 
                                            
14 Ibid., 33. 
15 The International Bill of Rights refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) its Optional Protocols, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and its Optional Protocols. (“Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The 
International Bill of Human Rights,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
last accessed April 10, 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf.) 
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protection and promotion of Indigenous Peoples.16 Furthermore, texts published by 
Ainu museums and Ainu organizations have proven useful to minimize second-hand 
misinformation. 
Chapter Overviews 
 This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter I: Indigenous Rights 
Discourse discusses how the spiral model can act as a framework of compromise 
between two popular explanatory perspectives in Indigenous rights discourse. To do so, 
I examine the strengths and weaknesses of the social perspective of the Indigenous 
rights movement and the legalist ration perspective of Indigenous rights in international 
law. Following this, I present a detailed explanation of the spiral model and its 
application to the case of Japan and the Ainu. 
 Chapter II: Japan Before the DRIP addresses the history of the Ainu prior to the 
UN General Assembly’s adoption of the DRIP in 2007. This chapter argues that the 
Japanese government’s interactions with domestic and international actors since World 
War II illustrate phase progression within the framework of the spiral model. 
Specifically, this chapter analyzes Japan’s movement through Phase 1, Repression and 
activation of networks, Phase 2, Denial, and the earlier stages of Phase 3, tactical 
concessions. 
 Chapter III: The DRIP’s Effect in Japan demonstrates how the DRIP has 
furthered the development of Ainu Indigenous rights. To do this, I examine what policy 
steps the Japanese government has taken, or failed to take, over the past decade. This 
                                            
16 Mitsuhara Okada, “The Plight of Ainu, Indigenous People of Japan,” Journal of Indigenous 
Development, 1, no.1 (2012): 1-14, accessed April 10, 2017, 
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/21976/v1i1_02okada.pdf. 
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chapter concurrently argues that the DRIP played a role in the Japanese government’s 
recognition of the Ainu in 2008. This chapter recognizes this as a pivotal point in time 
that moves Japan into Phase 4, prescriptive status. However, further changes are 
necessary for Japan to eventually enter Phase 5, rule-consistent behavior. 
 In conclusion, I review this project through the broader context of international 
norms. Here, I consider how Japan’s experiences with Indigenous rights norms may be 
applicable to other states. This project concludes with suggestions for activists that may 
seek to further Indigenous rights in other states. 
Conclusion 
 This thesis analyzes the role of the DRIP in regards to the successful recognition 
of the Ainu as an Indigenous People. Using the spiral method as my framework, I 
expect to find that the DRIP moderately effected the development of Japanese 
Indigenous rights law. Additionally, this result will likely be aided by domestic-
transnational social networks that can then apply pressure against the Japanese 
government for change from above and below.  
 9 
 
Chapter I: Indigenous Rights Discourse 
The emergence of suitable international conditions for the development of 
Indigenous rights is a recent phenomenon that originated from changes in the world’s 
political climate following the end of World War II. The establishment of the United 
Nations helped to create an institutional framework to codify new international norms, 
including the current international human rights regime. As human rights have 
progressed, more nuanced classes of protection have developed that target classes such 
as children, women, and Indigenous Peoples. 
This chapter seeks to answer two broad questions that will help set up the 
analyses in Chapters II and III. First, what have other scholars found regarding the 
question of how international norms are thought to influence domestic politics, 
specifically as it pertains to international human rights norms such as Indigenous rights? 
To answer this question, I look at two different approaches utilized by scholars: (1) 
viewing Indigenous rights as a global social movement and (2) viewing these rights 
from a legalist rational perspective. From examining these two approaches, I determine 
that the spiral model acts as a unique intersection that offers a nuanced application of 
both aforementioned scholarly approaches.  
Second, how does the spiral model suggest that the DRIP influenced the 
recognition of the Ainu in Japan? In answering this question, I will provide a general 
overview of the spiral model as a means of analysis for human rights norms. This 
overview includes an introduction on how each phase of the model will correspond with 
historical developments of the Ainu movement. I also offer a brief discussion of the 
DRIP, but specific details as to its effects are largely reserved for Chapter III. 
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Global Movement or Legalist Rational Perspective? 
The willingness of the international community to accommodate Indigenous 
Peoples is a fairly recent phenomenon that developed alongside post-World War II 
ideals of universal human rights.17 Prior international norms accepted and promoted 
colonialism as an essential element of state control over Indigenous populations. The 
Doctrine of Discovery, among other colonial norms, acted as a legal justification for 
European states to “carve-up” large portions of the world how they saw fit.18 Indigenous 
issues were considered an internal affair with little political leverage granted to the 
Indigenous population. These norms continued until the atrocities of World War II 
provoked a global realization that states could not be expected to always decide in the 
best interest of its citizens or imperial subjects. Specifically, a state’s minority 
population was seen as vulnerable to the whims of a state’s majority that could be 
stimulated by populist demands. Regarding Indigenous Peoples specifically, changes 
enacted since then can be interpreted in two ways: (1) as a social movement for 
Indigenous rights or (2) as a legalist rational explanation of international norm adoption. 
Stated in other terms, these two categories generally represent a bottom-up or top-down 
approach, respectively. However, as we shall she later, the spiral model offers a 
compromise between the two perspectives. The spiral model considers social 
communications between both domestic and international actors as necessary to explain 
how the Japanese government’s Ainu policies changed to better reflect international 
Indigenous rights norms. 
                                            
17 Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 30. 
18 Pope Alexander VI, The Doctrine of Discovery, 1493, The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, 
accessed April 10, 2017, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/imperial-
rivalries/resources/doctrine-discovery-1493. 
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Indigenous Rights as a Movement: The Social Perspective 
Scholarly works discussing the Indigenous rights movement often view this 
perspective as a bottom-up approach, examining grassroots movements as instrumental 
to change nationally and internationally.19 Despite the Indigenous movement’s lack of 
international traction prior to the post-World War II period, scholars largely trace the 
beginnings of this movement to Deskaheh, the leader of the Iroquois Confederacy of 
Six Nations at Grand River. Deskaheh appealed to the League of Nations in 1923 
asking them to recognize the Confederacy’s sovereignty.20 A similar petition for 
sovereignty was made a few years later by Maori religious leader T.W. Ratana. Both of 
these petitions to an international forum arose after the appealing parties became 
frustrated with their state’s unwillingness to recognize them.21 Despite the League’s 
refusal to hear Deskaheh and Ratana’s petition, their efforts would lay the groundwork 
for future appeals to international bodies by Indigenous Peoples years later. 
The Indigenous movement of the late 20th Century served as support and 
publicity for Indigenous communities to expand grass-root claims of self-determination 
to an international audience. Niezen argued that four aspects of the postwar era 
                                            
19 Jose Vargas Hernandez and Mohammad Reza Noruzi, “Historical Social and Indigenous Ecology 
Approach to Social Movements in Mexico and Latin America,” Asian Culture and History 2, no. 2 (2010), 
178, accessed April 22, 2017, http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ach/article/view/6602; Nancy 
Romer, “Bolivia: Latin America’s Experiment in Grassroots Democracy,” New Politics XI-4, no. 44 (2008), 
accessed April 22, 2017, http://newpol.org/content/bolivia-latin-americas-experiment-grassroots-
democracy. 
20 “Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Voices,” United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UN 
Department of Public Information, 2007), 7, accessed April 10, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/unpfiibrochure_en07.pdf. 
21 Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, “A Decade of Rhetoric for Indigenous Peoples,” Indian Country 
Today (May 11, 2004), accessed April 22, 2017, http://www.corntassel.net/print_rhetoric.htm; 
“Tahupōtiki Wiremu Rātana, Biography,” NZ History, accessed April 22, 2017, 
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/people/tahupotiki-wiremu-ratana. 
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contributed to the new international climate.22 These were (1) the realization that states 
could not always be relied on to protect their own citizens, (2) the dismantling of 
European colonialism, (3) the failure of educational assimilatory policies to eliminate 
tribal culture and tradition, and (4) the development of an Indigenous middle-class.23 
The first two factors are direct effects of World War II. The first factor recalls not only 
the horrors of Nazi concentration camps, but also the internment of Japanese-
Americans. The second factor considers the role of international organizations and 
instruments during the decolonization of many parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
after World War II. However, it is worth noting that the third factor’s failure to 
completely eliminate Indigenous culture and tradition should not be misconstrued as 
having no effect on Indigenous populations. In many instances, Indigenous cultures, 
traditions, and languages were irreparably changed through educational assimilation. 
Still, these programs often led to the development of Indigenous support groups and 
organizations that eventually joined to form Indigenous lobbying communities.24 These 
lobbying communities would form the foundation of public power during the 
Indigenous movement. Likewise, the fourth factor created a class of Indigenous 
individuals educationally equipped to work alongside non-governmental organizations 
to provide socio-economic improvements for other Indigenous Peoples.25  
Niezen argued the existence of an “international Indigenism” joined different 
groups of peoples across multiple continents with very few similarities. Indigenous 
populations can vary greatly geographically, politically, and culturally. Instead, these 
                                            
22 Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism, 40. 
23 Ibid., 40-42. 
24 Ibid., 42. 
25 Ibid. 
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populations relate through a consistent pattern of colonial subjugation that often 
included land appropriation, prohibition of cultural amenities and ideals, abrogation of 
treaties, and relegation to a lesser status than the colonizing population.26 Niezen finds 
that these common historical experiences have proven to be an effective joining factor 
between Indigenous populations all over the world regardless of their other 
differences.27 
An important part of Indigenous rights discourse is the debate over self-
determination.28 Some states fear Indigenous self-determination as an inherent grant of 
right to secession from the state territory.29 Gilbert argued that although a nexus 
between self-determination and land rights certainly exists within the liberal ideals “of a 
people entitled to pursue its own destiny,” current understandings of self-determination 
within Indigenous rights appear to be much narrower.30 “In a post-colonial context, 
there is an increasing movement towards the recognition of a right to self-determination 
as comprising a right to effective political participation within the State’s borders.”31 
Likewise, Niezen has stated that Indigenous Peoples “do evince many features of 
nationalism but do not as a rule aspire to independent statehood.”32 Indigenism can be 
distinguished from other forms of ethno-nationalism in three ways. First, most 
Indigenous populations are smaller in population. Second, secession would absolve the 
                                            
26 Ibid., 87. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Jeremie Gilbert, “Self-Determination and Autonomy: Emerging Standards on Territorial Negotiations,” 
in Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights Under International Law, From Victims to Actors (Transnational 
Publishers 2006), 199-249; Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism, 203-05. 
29 Gilbert, “Self-Determination and Autonomy: Emerging Standards on Territorial Negotiations,” 199. 
30 Ibid., 200-01. 
31 Ibid., 201. 
32 Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism, 204-05. 
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former host state of treaty and trust obligations. Third, the Indigenous rights movement 
acts as a disincentive toward Indigenous secession since recognition and in-group 
membership can be obtained without leaving the host country.33 Instead of creating a 
separate state, Indigenous self-determination is more likely to occur in states regarding 
the property and usufructuary rights of land and resources. However, ethno-nationalism, 
where a nation is defined by ethnicity, can arise among Indigenous nations within 
settler-colonial states.34 
Another debate within Indigenous rights discourse is the conceptualization of 
Indigenous rights as both individual and collective rights. Most human rights within the 
current international regime stem from the rights of individuals. The terminology of 
“peoples” is troubling for some human rights scholars who fear this language departs 
from the anchor of individualism in human rights and creates a group construct to 
oppress the individual.35 However, Niezen explains that the overemphasis on the 
individual in practice can interpose burdens to Indigenous populations similar to 
discredited Indian policies of the 19th Century.36 International actors have slowly begun 
to realize the importance of cultural membership, and that an individual can have 
several group loyalties as part of his or her intersectional identity.37 
 
 
                                            
33 Ibid. 
34 Paul Nasady, “Boundaries among Kin: Sovereignty, the Modern Treaty Process, and the Rise of Ethno-
Territorial Nationalism among Yukon First Nations,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 54 no. 3 
(2012) 499-532, 503, accessed May 4, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417512000217. 
35 Ibid., 128. 
36 Ibid., 129. 
37 Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self Determination, Culture and 
Land (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007), 38-39. 
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Indigenous Rights as Law: The Legalist Rational Perspective 
The other major thought as to why states comply with international rules and 
norms is the legalist rational perspective. Likewise, discussions involving Indigenous 
self-determination and collective rights are viewable through the legalist rational 
perspective as well. Self-determination is widely held to be a principle of customary 
international law, perhaps even reaching the status of jus cogen or a preemptory norm.38 
Legal institutions and international treaties have a strong basis of decolonization and 
empowerment of minority populations. For example, the UN Charter, Chapter XI, 
Articles 73 and 74 are the basis of UN decolonization efforts.39 Eighty former colonies 
have gained independence and thereby their right to self-determination since 1945 and 
all eleven territories originally placed under trusteeship of the UN achieved self-
determination.40 Some view self-determination as “an integral part of the right of people 
to choose their own political regime and to be free of authorization oppression.”41 
Conversely, others view self-determination more modestly, and reserve secession as a 
final effort against egregious violations. Collective rights can be viewed as inherently 
opposing codified individual rights or as interdependent through current international 
norms.  
 The legalist rational perspective explains human rights compliance through a 
top-down approach, with most change originating at the international level through 
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treaties and other international documents.42 These documents broadly codify 
international norms that can then be applied against norm-violating states. For example, 
to ensure that states adhere to international law, international actors can utilize shame to 
apply social pressure for change. Shaming is regarded as “a deliberate attempt to 
negatively impact a state, regime, or leader’s reputation by publicizing and targeting 
violations of international law norms.”43 A bad international reputation can have actual 
negative effects within the international arena politically and economically. Therefore, 
the threat of being shamed can be a motivating factor for states to correct domestic law.  
 Undoubtedly, major international documents such as the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Bill of Rights play a major role in 
shaping Indigenous rights from a legalist rational perspective. However, a state’s 
motives for ratifying international treaties remains debatable. Hathaway argued that 
states are more likely to ratify international treaties if they can gain social benefits for 
their position rather than if the same benefits can be gained through a treaty’s effect.44 
Simply being a member of a treaty creates trust and avenues of social interaction 
between states that outweigh the negative effects of the treaty. Conversely, Simmons 
argued that recorded state behaviors do not support this interpretation. Instead, most 
governments take the responsibilities entailed in treaties seriously and act rationally 
when choosing whether to ratify a treaty. States are more likely to ratify treaties they 
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believe in and oppose treaties they find threatening.45 These international agreements 
act as a codification of Indigenous norms that can prevent rights reduction over time in 
the international arena. 
 Guzman also argues that one of the driving forces for states to comply with 
international norms is their reputational benefits. According to Guzman, states have no 
particular desire for a good international reputation, but ratification of treaties presents 
opportunities to create goodwill and potential future gains. 46  “If improving one’s 
reputation can yield value in the form of higher payoffs, then states have an incentive to 
develop and maintain a good reputation.”47 A good reputation frames the state as a 
credible partner for future cooperative arrangements that may prove beneficial. These 
benefits may be financial, greater reciprocal concessions, or future promises. 48 
Conversely, the opposite effects may be had if a state has a less favorable reputation. 
Therefore, reputation creates a rational incentive for states to comply with international 
norms.  
Xanthaki has pointed out that international monitoring mechanisms have 
“intensified [their] monitoring of Indigenous issues” since the start of the 21st Century.49 
For instance, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) has continuously been interpreted as granting strong indigenous land rights.50 
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Likewise, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued General 
Comment No. 14, encouraging the protection of medicinal plants, animals and minerals 
necessary for the implementation of Indigenous healthcare plans.51 Additionally, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1965) created the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) to 
monitor the implementation of the Convention. Some examples of CERD’s action 
includes its 1997 General Comment No. 23 on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, and 
multiple usage of it “Urgent Action Procedure” against states such as New Zealand and 
the United States to push states away from policies deemed discriminatory to 
Indigenous populations.52 
 Although this list of influential international documents could, no doubt, be 
elaborated, I wish to instead focus on one particular convention that laid the foundation 
for the eventual adoption of the DRIP—the International Labor Organization 
Convention 169 (C169) – the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989.53 Prior 
to late 2000s, C169 was labeled “international law’s most concrete manifestation of the 
growing responsiveness to [I]ndigenous [P]eoples’ demands.”54 C169 is described as a 
revision to a prior outdated convention from 1957, Convention 107 (C107). The 
distinguishing factor between C107 and C169 was the special inclusion of Indigenous 
leaders during the drafting of C169. Conversely, C107 did not account for desires of 
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Indigenous peoples, but rather sought to protect Indigenous Peoples “through 
assimilation and integration into mainstream society.”55 As Anaya notes in his analysis, 
the core of C169 was fundamentally different from its predecessor.56 
The basic theme of C169 is indicated by the treaty’s preamble, which recognizes 
“the aspirations of [Indigenous] [P]eoples to exercise control over their own institutions, 
ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, 
languages, and religions, within the framework of the States in which they live.”57 Upon 
this premise, the treaty included provisions advancing indigenous cultural integrity, land 
and resource rights, and non-discrimination in social welfare spheres; and it generally 
enjoins states to respect Indigenous Peoples’ aspirations in all decisions affecting 
them.58 Other specific rights in C169 include the adoption of special measures for 
safeguarding persons, institutions, property, labor, culture and the environment (Art. 4), 
self-determination of development and improvement of livelihood, (Art. 7), ownership 
and possession of traditional lands (Art. 14) and procedural transmission of land rights 
(Art. 17).59  
The weakness of C169 lies in its limited ratification. A convention is legally 
binding only for those parties that choose to ratify it. Neither Japan nor a majority of 
large state actors with Indigenous populations, such as the U.S., have ratified C169. In 
fact, a majority of those ratifying states are concentrated in Latin America. 
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Nevertheless, Anaya argued the significance of C169 should not be understated, 
because it contributed to a growing area of customary international law regarding 
Indigenous rights.60 
In regards to Japan’s ratification of ILO treaties, one pre-World War II treaty 
may implicate the Japanese government’s earlier recognition of the Ainu. This treaty is 
1939’s C050 – Recruiting Indigenous Workers Convention.61 Although the treaty was 
designed to allow states to recruit workers “who do not spontaneously offer their 
services,” the treaty indicates an understanding of an existing difference within the 
state-Indigenous society relationship. C050 definition of indigenous workers includes 
“workers belonging to or assimilated to the dependent Indigenous populations of the 
home territories of Members of the Organisation.”62 Additionally, Article 5 restricts 
labor recruitment before a competent authority has considered the withdrawal of adult 
males (workers) from within the social life of the population. However, it is unclear as 
to who the competent authority is to make certain decisions within the rules of the 
convention, whether that is the state or an external governing body. It is no surprise that 
international documents pre-dating World War II fell short of the protections we have 
come to expect since the creation of the United Nations and the UDHR. At a minimum, 
C050 exemplifies that the Japanese government was a signatory to an early convention 
that considered the effects that a state’s majority population could have on the local 
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Indigenous minority. The legalist rational model accounts for Japanese government’s 
ratification of C050, but not C169, through a cost-benefit analysis. C050 provides 
economic incentives with little restriction on the actions of the Japanese government. 
On the other hand, C169 would provide heavier restrictions against the Japanese 
government, and had little economic or reputational benefit. 
 Both social movements and legalist rational perspectives play an important role 
in Indigenous rights discourse. However, the spiral model offers a unique application of 
these two aforementioned approaches, because it considers both the grassroots 
movements of oppressed groups and the actions of international organizations. It 
highlights the importance of domestic-transnational social ties while also considering 
the legalist rational interpretations of current international laws and norms. The model 
therefore explains how the local grassroots movement is able to apply pressure from the 
“bottom-up” while international organizations simultaneously pressure change from the 
“top-down.”  
The Spiral Model and the DRIP’s Influence on the Ainu of Japan 
 The DRIP is the central piece of my analysis on Japan. It is not only an example 
of an international instrument, but also demonstrates the growth of international norms 
through codification since the beginning of modern human rights discourse. For my 
overall argument, this means that codification of international norms may prolong their 
existence, making states much more likely to successfully navigate through the entirety 
of the five phase spiral model.  
 In this section, I first provide a brief outline describing the DRIP and its 
purpose. Then, I explore my proposed model of explanation through a brief description 
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of the model’s five stages proposed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink. Additionally, I 
introduce how I plan to argue, through the spiral model, that the DRIP influenced the 
recognition of the Ainu in Japan in 2008.  
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 The DRIP was preceded in 1993 by the U.N. proclaimed “Year of the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples,” which was largely seen as disappointing with little action from 
states to change.63 This year later turned into an International Decade (1995-2004), 
followed by the Second International Decade (2005-2014).64 The creation of the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was a positive effect of 1993 that arguably 
played an integral part in future negotiations.65 DRIP negotiations continued throughout 
this time until 2008. Upon the UN General Assembly’s vote in favor of its adoption, 
143 states, including Japan, consisted of the majority needed to adopt the DRIP. The 
four states that initially voted against its adoption (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and 
the United States) would eventually reverse their positions and adopt the DRIP as 
well.66 
 The DRIP adoption on August 13, 2007 was the culmination of an intense 
negotiation period that lasted over two decades. These discussions included 
representatives from states and Indigenous populations who sought to create a 
document that sufficiently met the needs of Indigenous populations while remaining 
adoptable by the UN General Assembly. The DRIP reflected a growing source of 
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customary international law despite its non-binding nature as a declaration. It was 
designed to function as “a universal framework of minimum standards for the survival, 
dignity and well-being of Indigenous Peoples.”67 These protections included an already 
well-established list of individual rights, now reiterated in the Indigenous context, as 
well as collective rights such as the right to culture, language, and freedom from 
assimilation. Indigenous Peoples hold the right to self-governance as an exercise of self-
determination under Article 4 “in matter relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomy.”68 This included copyright 
protections and land rights granted to Indigenous peoples. The DRIP also indirectly 
addressed other human rights that reflects human rights norms, but have failed to be 
directly included in international instruments, such as the prohibition of ethnocide. 69 
Furthermore, states are charged with taking effective measures to promote tolerance 
from non-Indigenous state citizens, and are required to help Indigenous Peoples 
implement programs to revitalize and promote their culture. These ideals are listed and 
summarized throughout the DRIP’s forty-six articles. 
 Despite the DRIP’s ambitious language, a few major weaknesses continue to 
draw criticism. First, the DRIP fails to precisely define the term “Indigenous.” This 
omission aided in the DRIP’s initial adoption in the UN General Assembly because it 
inherently granted states the power to determine if a populations was Indigenous. 
Populations that failed to be listed and considered before the UN decolonization 
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committee were therefore much more unlikely to be recognized.70 Second, Articles 25-
26 recognized Indigenous rights to land, territory, and other natural resources. These 
articles largely reflected land rights codified in ILO C169 that initially gave pause to 
many states.71 Strong interpretation of these articles might create large cessionary 
impacts on states originally founded through colonialization, particularly in the four 
states that originally voted against the DRIP: The United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand. To rectify this, the four opposing states did not view these articles as 
guaranteeing the right to secession upon adoption of the DRIP. Finally, the DRIP’s 
status as a declaration makes it non-binding on states. This means that most of the 
document’s language can be considered aspirational. Very few avenues of recourse can 
be taken against states that continue to violate the DRIP beyond social shaming and 
public embarrassment. Still, the DRIP plays a significant role in Indigenous rights as a 
widely recognized document of codified international norms.72 The following section 
will explain how these social punishments play into my analysis and may still provide 
real change for Indigenous populations. 
Applying the Model 
 This section provides a basic outline of the spiral model and its five phases. 
Each subsection details the expected interactions of the domestic opposition, the state, 
and the international community. Additionally, these subsections include how each 
phase of the model will correspond with the historical development of the Ainu 
movement. 
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 What is the Spiral Model? 
 The spiral model is a five-phase model that seeks to explain the processes by 
which a repressive state can internalize international norms promoted by domestic 
grassroots movements and transnational actors. This process relies on sustainable social 
networks between the domestic and international levels to distribute information and 
apply pressure from a top-down and bottom-up approach simultaneously. Rather than 
focusing solely on the role of international policies, the model “explore[s] the 
conditions under which networks of domestic and international actors are able to change 
these domestic structures themselves.”73 Most prior applications of the spiral model 
largely focus on the state internalization process of human rights norms. This is largely 
because human rights naturally challenge a state’s ability to rule over its domestic 
society, they are well established through international institutions and regimes, and 
they compete with other principled ideas. 74 Sustainable domestic-transnational 
communication, without the state acting as a necessary go-between, allows domestic 
problems to be raised directly and openly in the international arena. This pattern of 
communication has been characterized as a “boomerang throw” since the repressed 
domestic group bypasses the state to interact with actors on the international stage.75 
The spiral model require continuous pressure from above and below between the 
repressed domestic group and international actors. 
 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink argue that the process of a state’s internalization of 
international norms is reliant on a process of socialization. Socialization is defined as 
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“the process by which principled ideas held by individuals become norms in the sense 
of collective understandings about appropriate behavior which then leads to changes in 
identities, interest, and behavior [of the state].”76 Although not bound to this order, states 
often begin the socialization process through instrumental adaptations in reaction to 
pressure domestically and internationally.77 This may include some tactical concessions, 
such as releasing prisoners or signing international agreements. As the process continues, 
states often engage with argumentative discourse, which includes governmental 
adaptation, strategic bargaining, persuasion, argumentation, and moral-consciousness-
raising.78 Finally, as the state further internalizes international norms, it will begin to 
institutionalize and habitualize these norms within its society. 79  This process is 
dependent on social interactions between the state and other domestic and international 
actors that apply pressure. 
 Utilizing domestic-transnational social structures provide three different 
benefits for domestic opposition groups: (1) moral consciousness-raising, (2) 
empowerment and legitimization of domestic groups against norm-violating states, and 
(3) the creation of a challenge mechanism to pressure the state to adopt and follow 
norms by pressuring “from above and below.”80 Repressive regimes often adopt 
international standards to avoid international scrutiny and project a façade of 
compliance. Domestic-transnational networks continue the process of social scrutiny 
against the violating state to increase the likelihood of internalizing international norms. 
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 The five phases of the spiral model are as follows: (1) Repression and activation 
of networks, (2) Denial, (3) Tactical concessions, (4) Prescriptive status, and (5) Rule-
consistent behavior.81 Evolutionary progress should not be assumed within this model, 
as state responses to endogenous and exogenous pressures might also result in a return 
to repressive practices.82 Still, this model offers an analytical framework for 
understanding how international and domestic pressures may result in a state’s 
internalization of and compliance with international norms. Additionally, this model 
offers an explanation why the Japanese government was willing to recognize the Ainu 
as an Indigenous People less than one year after the adoption of the DRIP and only a 
decade removed from a century of assimilatory policies. 
Phase 1: Repression and Activation of Networks 
 The first phase starts with very high levels of repression by the state against the 
domestic group. “[D]omestic societal opposition is too weak and/or too oppressed to 
present a significant challenge to the government.”83 Domestic opposition forces must 
socially connect to transnational actors to put the norm-violating state on the 
international agenda for investigation. However, if social links are frequently 
suppressed, the state’s time spent in Phase 1 can be exceedingly lengthy. Levels of state 
repression may vary from mild levels to extreme levels bordering genocide, and a 
state’s level of repression can often indicate the likelihood of the emergence of 
domestic-transnational social links.84 
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 My analysis for the Ainu (Chapter II) begins at the end of World War II in 
1945. This determination already distinguishes my analysis from a majority of Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink’s examples because it predates the 1970s international human rights 
movement. Many of their examples focus on states that established authoritarian 
governments around or slightly before the 1970s. However, Japan’s governmental 
liberalization preceded the human rights movements. The Taisho Democracy 
Movement (1912-1931), a brief era of political liberalism, ended with the Manchurian 
Incident of 1931.85 Ultra-nationalism and militarism grew in Japan under the Showa 
Emperor and eventually led to Japan’s involvement in World War II.86 Japan’s post-
war constitution elevated the role of the National Diet, a bicameral parliamentary 
legislature with representatives elected by the people, and the Emperor forced to 
disavow his own divinity and become no more than a political figurehead.87 Earlier 
liberalization without a regression into authoritarian governance enabled the Ainu to 
quickly establish domestic-transnational social ties with limited repression during the 
human rights movement of the 1970s. This quickened Japan’s transition into Phase 2 
during the 1970s. 
Phase 2: Denial 
 While oppression of the Ainu continued through Phase 2, the Japanese 
government was forced to respond to international and domestic allegations of 
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Indigenous norm violations. The placement of norm-violating states onto the 
international agenda for human rights begins Phase 2. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
characterize the initial beginnings of Phase 2 as “the production and dissemination of 
information about human rights practices in the target state.”88 With cooperative 
involvement from human rights organizations in the repressive state, the information is 
delivered through transnational networks to lobby international human rights 
organizations and liberal states for aid.89 Lobbyists often adopt an aura of “moral 
persuasion” to pressure states and other international organizations that claim to 
condemn the violating state. Once a promoting state or organization begins to champion 
the lobbied message, the norm-violating state often responds to these exogenous 
pressures with denial through accusatory claims of illegitimate intervention in internal 
affairs.90 Domestic opposition remains vulnerable during this phase. Initial attempts to 
persuade violating states may appear counter-productive, particularly if the state 
increases its repression of the domestic opposition. Some states may attempt to bribe or 
eliminate the domestic opposition.91 However, the norm-violating state’s need to 
respond to these accusations already shows that the socialization process has begun. If 
exogenous social pressures were of no concern to the norm-violating state, then it would 
have no need to respond. 
 For Japan, phase 2 reflected the above process. As the influence of the civil 
rights and Indigenous movements of the 1970s started to be felt in Japan, denial of 
                                            
88 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, 22. 
89 Ibid., 23. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 24. 
 30 
 
continued Ainu existence by the Japanese government steadily increased.92 When the 
UN Commission on Human Rights inquired about the Ainu in 1980, the Japanese 
government remained adamant that the Ainu were neither a minority nor an Indigenous 
population.93 The government’s positon would remain as such until the 1990s. 
Phase 3: Tactical Concessions 
 During this phase the pressures from both domestic and international 
oppositions have begun to shift the policy of the norm-violating state. In an attempt to 
ease this pressure or recover previous support from liberal states, the norm-violating 
state may seek to temporarily-improve the condition of the repressed domestic group. 
Tactical concessions from a norm-violating state, such as the release of political 
prisoners or signing international treaties, can empower the domestic opposition to 
continue to strive for change from within the state. Additionally, domestic-transnational 
networks are often strengthened through these concessions. However, Phase 3 is a 
deciding moment within the model. These concessions can result in “enduring change” 
toward internalization of international norms or a “backlash” that reinstates oppressive 
governance.94 If this tenuous scenario is successfully navigated, the norm-violating state 
will begin to lose control of the domestic situation. Simply put, “people start losing their 
fears.”95 The state then begins to become entrapped in their own language from 
previous human rights negotiations. 
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 The clearest evidence of Phase 3’s existence in Japan occurred in 1997 with the 
repeal of the 1899 Law for the Protection of Aborigines (1899 Protection Act). It was 
replaced by the Promotion Act of Ainu Culture and Dissemination of Knowledge 
Regarding Ainu Traditions (1997 Promotion Act).96 While the act did not recognize the 
Ainu as an Indigenous People, it was the first law in Japanese history to recognize the 
presence of a minority population. This act was preceded two months earlier by the 
landmark legal case issued by the Sapporo District Court, Kayano et al. v. Hokkaido 
Expropriation Committee (The Nibutani Dam decision), which first included the 
recognition of the Ainu as a minority population.97 The Japanese government continued 
to avoid recognizing the Ainu as Indigenous until 2008. 
Phase 4: Prescriptive Status 
 This phase begins when a state no longer finds the validity of the international 
norms controversial. Although the state might continue to violate these norms, it has 
begun to critique itself. A state’s display of four specific indicators determines whether 
a state has accepted of the validity of human rights norms.98 First, the state has ratified 
all or most of the major human rights conventions. Second, international norms have 
been integrated into the state’s constitution and/or domestic law. Third, some 
institutionalized mechanism, such as a specialized court or council, must provide access 
for domestic groups to report violations. Finally, the state acknowledges the value of 
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human rights norms through its rhetoric, and continuously engages in constructive 
dialogue with critics.99 However, successful change within a state must go beyond 
norm-appeasing rhetoric. Real change toward domestic enforcement of these norms 
must be present. 
 Here is where the DRIP plays a crucial role in the development of Ainu rights. 
The DRIPs adoption, followed shortly thereafter by the recognition of the Ainu in 2008, 
presents the likely scenario that the DRIP accelerated Japan’s transition from Phase 3 to 
Phase 4. Ainu Indigenous recognition exemplifies Japanese government’s acceptance of 
international norms pertaining to Indigenous Peoples. Furthermore, the four phase 
indicators are met in at least some minimum capacity from this point forward.  
Phase 5: Rule-Consistent Behavior 
 Finally, Phase 5 is achieved when the state fully adopts international norms and 
their institutions. This phase is difficult for the state to remain in, and continued 
pressure through social networks are vital for sustainable state improvements.100 This 
task grows increasingly difficult once gross violations are ended and the international 
limelight is transferred to other areas of importance. In order to sustain these necessary 
social pressures, the state must fully institutionalize norm compliance measures and 
habitualize their practices through law enforcement. Assuming these measures are 
taken, the state has successfully internalized international norms. 
 My current analysis places Japan in Phase 4 of the spiral model, but potential for 
the state’s future transition to Phase 5 is already present. In 2020, the Symbolic Space 
for Ethnic Harmony will open for the protection and promotion of Ainu culture. Steps 
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are also being taken to revise repatriation laws for Ainu ancestral remains and funerary 
items. Likewise, discussions to aid the Ainu population through education and 
employment have increased, and include the active input of Ainu cultural leaders. 
Keeping in mind the Indigenous rights and international norms mentioned previously, 
the remainder of this project will focus on identifying and applying facts relevant to my 
case study of the Ainu within the framework of the five-phase spiral model. 
Conclusion  
 Chapter I has provided a general overview of two methods to interpret the 
development of Indigenous rights norms: social movements and the legalist rational 
model. Both of these models provide valuable insight into a state’s internalization 
process of international norms, but fail to thoroughly account for the strengths of the 
other model. The spiral model bridges this gap. It offers an explanation why domestic 
pressure from below and international pressure from above both play a vital role in 
implementing change. In the next two chapters, I examine the state of affairs between 
the Ainu and the Japanese government as a case study within the framework of the 
spiral model. 
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Chapter II: Japan Before the DRIP 
 This chapter seeks to position Ainu history within the spiral model prior to the 
DRIP’s adoption in 2007. However, I first find it necessary to present a background of 
the Ainu to distinguish them from the Wajin historically, genetically, and culturally. 
This chapter also details Japan’s first three phases of the spiral model: (1) Repression 
and activation of networks, (2) Denial, and (3) Tactical concessions. My analysis places 
Phase 1 between the end of World War II and the early 1970s. Phase 2 extends from the 
mid-1970s to 1997, and encompasses multiple denials of continued Ainu existence by 
the Japanese government. Finally, Phase 3 begins with the repeal of the 1889 Protection 
Act in 1997, and ends in 2008 with the recognition of Ainu Indigeneity. However, the 
latter half of my Phase 3 analysis continues in Chapter III, and focuses on the DRIP’s 
influence in Japan. 
Historical Indigeneity 
 Early ancestors of the Ainu were hunter-gatherers without a written language. 
Instead, they depended upon a process of rich oral story-telling to pass down cultural 
history. Two of the earliest Wajin records prove the presence of the early Ainu in Japan 
during the 6th Century: the Kojiki (712 AD) and the Nihongi (720 AD).101 Wajin 
writings dating back to the 8th Century also evidenced friendly and hostile interactions 
with native peoples to the north of them, whom they called the Emishi.102 “Ainu 
culture” culminated during the early 13th Century from a blending of Jomon, Epi-
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Jomon, Satsumon, and Okhotsk cultures.103 By the 17th Century, “intensive contact” 
between the Ainu and the Wajin had forced the Ainu to withdraw from northern Honshu 
into Hokkaido, southern Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands.104Ainu genetics and physical 
characteristics differed from the southern Wajin population. Many historical 
photographical and textual depictions of Ainu men include long beards more relatable 
to Mongoloid populations rather than the Wajin.105 Genetic comparisons of ancient 
DNA between Jomon and Yayoi societies have further distinguished the ethno-genesis 
of the Ainu and Wajin populations. For instance, the G and Y haplogroups dominant in 
Ainu populations are absent or scarce in Okinawan and Wajin populations, indicating 
Ainu genetic transferal likely derived from Siberia rather than Southern Japan, creating 
a new population.106  
 Wajin colonization of Ainu lands is first demonstrated through three military 
encounters and the establishment of the Matsumae fief in southern Hokkaido. All three 
encounters (Kosyamain—1457, Syaksyain—1669, Kunasiri-Menasi—1789) ended in 
Ainu military defeat and eventually placed Ainu communities under Japanese sovereign 
territorial rule.107 Likewise, the establishment of the Matsumae fief in 1604 was a 
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precursor to further land expropriations of the next few centuries.108 The Meiji 
government created the Hokkaido Colonization Commission in 1869. The Commission 
was specifically tasked with developing sparsely populated regions of Hokkaido and 
“civilizing” the Ainu.109 To do this, strict assimilatory policies were implemented. 
These policies included restrictions on Ainu traditional hunting/gathering, prohibition of 
Ainu language, forcible adoption of farming, and the enrollment of all Ainu as Japanese 
subjects.110 Large areas of land once occupied by the Ainu were categorized as terra 
nullius, which provided legal justification for the Japanese government to claim and 
distribute land according to its desires.111 With the loss of their means of survival, 
increased Wajin migration to Hokkaido, and a growing problem of foreign diseases in 
Ainu communities, the Ainu population dropped dramatically between 1873 and 
1936.112  
Meiji-era assimilation efforts were further reinforced with the enactment of the 
1899 Protection Act, which called for the “dissolution of the Ainu culture and society, 
and final assimilation.”113 Additionally, the act labeled the Ainu as “former aborigines,” 
a title that would continue for nearly a century.114 Instead of resisting, many Ainu 
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struggled to adapt to life as Japanese subjects in order to survive. The 1899 Protection 
Act survived for nearly a century with only a few of its most unpopular sections being 
repealed during the 1930s.115  
 Beside the unsuccessful efforts of Ainu activist Kannari Tarō during the late 19th 
Century, Ainu communities largely remained silent within Japanese politics.116 As the 
Ainu’s integration within the Japanese system continued during the 20th Century, Ainu 
society became much more vocal about the enduring issues of political and 
socioeconomic inequalities. The establishment of the “Tokachi Kyokumeisha” (Tokachi 
Clear Dawn Society) on May 8, 1927, created the first Ainu organization intended for 
the “management and promotion of the culture and economy of the Ainu race.”117 
Although the Kyokumeisha claimed not to promote any radical political lines, its 
existence encouraged other Ainu to speak out against the Japanese government. One 
such example was Kaizawa Hiranosuke’s unsuccessful petition to the Japanese 
government for Ainu representation in the Congress of Asian Peoples in Nagasaki.118 
The Kyokumeisha’s continued efforts to revise the 1899 Protection Act resulted in a 
unanimous vote from 130 members to create the Hokkaido Ainu Kyokai (later renamed 
the Hokkaido Utari Kyokai in 1961) on July 18, 1930.119 However, the Kyokai’s early 
actions did not promote Ainu sovereignty. Some successful assimilation was seen as a 
way to help Ainu families escape poverty and alcoholism. Likewise, a lack of effective 
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avenues of redress left them little hope in persuading the Japanese government to allow, 
let alone support, Ainu culture.120 Nevertheless, the Kyokai provided the first large 
forum for Ainu to address communal issues and bond together under a common 
purpose.  
Phase 1: Repression and Activation of Networks - 1945 to Early-1970s 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Phase 1 entails “repression and the 
activation of networks.”121 My analysis starts with Japan’s entry in Phase 1 of the spiral 
model at the end of World War II, a time of rapid liberalization following the state’s 
surrender to the Allied powers. Additionally, post-war society in Japan developed the 
first human rights normative framework conducive to Indigenous rights. Dates prior to 
1945 do little to contribute to my analysis beyond emphasizing the longstanding 
existence of repression and domestic opposition against Ainu rights. The Japanese 
government’s early liberalization and continued inclusion in international human rights 
discussions aided Japan’s quick transition into Phase 2 once Indigenous rights were 
popularized during the 1970s human rights movement. Keeping this in mind, I have 
mapped Japan’s time in Phase 1 from 1945 to the early 1970s. 
Phase 1 of the spiral model entails two factors: (a) a repressive situation “where 
domestic societal opposition is too weak and/or too oppressed to present a significant 
challenge to the government,” and (b) the eventual activation of domestic-transnational 
advocacy networks capable of gathering enough information on the norm-violating state 
to place it on the international agenda.122 The first factor is often much easier to identify 
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based on consistent patterns of behavior extending a long time, possibly even centuries. 
For the Ainu and other Indigenous populations, the oppression perpetuated by the state 
stems from decades of policies that often include expropriation of lands, prohibition of 
language and/or traditions, and institutionalized assimilation policies. The activation of 
international advocacy networks was not possible for the Ainu Indigenous rights 
movement until the early 1970s. By then, efforts to generate change through domestic 
avenues were largely exhausted and frustrations had reached a boiling point. These 
frustrations prompted the Ainu to reach out to the international community to assist in 
placing pressure on the Japanese government. As domestic Ainu protests increased 
dramatically, additional attention turned to the global arena to relate Ainu struggles to 
similar narratives of other Indigenous and minority populations. 
(a) Repression 
With the surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, many Japanese citizens were 
repatriated from war-gained territories, including most of the Ainu inhabiting 
Sakhalin.123 Ainu and Wajin alike faced severe levels of poverty, and most Ainu 
worked alongside Wajin to restore Japan’s economic vitality.124 The Ainu movement re-
emerged after an eight year hiatus thanks largely to the emergence of a liberal post-war 
political government. Still, a heavy blow was dealt to Ainu livelihood with the 
Agricultural Land Readjustment Law of 1946 (1946 Readjustment Law). Over 1,200 
Ainu farmers lost their land holdings equaling 34% of arable lands in Japan.125 The 
1946 Readjustment Law was enacted despite significant Ainu attempts to appeal to the 
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Hokkaido governmental offices, the Imperial Household Ministry, and the occupying 
Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP).  
 Additionally, racial stigmas persisted in Japanese postwar society against the 
Ainu, and many Ainu renounced their ancestry to chase socio-economic opportunities in 
Tokyo and other cities in southern Japan. The Tokyo Ainu populations drastically 
increased during the 1960s because flourishing companies would mass-hire young Ainu 
workers and bring them from Sapporo to Tokyo.126 The Japanese government’s political 
presentation as a homogenous state exacerbated cultural tensions, and many Ainu faced 
discrimination regardless of their blood quantity levels. This discrimination wrongly 
branded the Ainu as an incapable of modernizing.127 Ainu frustrations peaked in 1968 
while Japan celebrated 100 years of development in Hokkaido.128 The celebration 
completely overlooked the existence of the Ainu population to perpetuate the 
government’s narrative of progressive modernization in geographically “empty space.”  
A new wave of Ainu activism emerged during the 1960s. Joined with the rise of 
youth movements across Japan and the international publicity of the U.S. Civil Rights 
Movement, growing public outcry against the marginalization of the Ainu became one 
of many civil rights topics in Japan.129 These activities challenged the developmental 
“empty space” history perpetuated by the Japanese government. Activism remained 
largely domestic until Ainu organizations began to appeal to the international 
community in the 1970s. Discrimination was still present within Japanese society, but 
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Ainu activists brought attention to these issues whenever possible. One form of this 
denounced discrimination included the use of Ainu stereotypes in the media on six 
separate occasions: the Hokkaido Broadcasting Company in 1973, a popular TV show 
in 1973 Mito Komon, an offensive promotional poster for Hokkaido goods displayed at 
Tokyo department stores in 1974, a discriminatory cartoon in magazine Pureiboi in 
1978, and advertisements in The Japan Times in 1979 and 1981.130  
(b) Activation of Domestic-Transnational Advocacy Networks 
 Media coverage of the Indigenous Civil Rights movements in the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand was readily available in Japan during the early 
1970s. However, the first delegation of Ainu representatives to travel abroad went to 
none of the aforementioned states. Instead, initial domestic-transnational ties were 
established between the Ainu and autonomous minority regions in China.131 A 
delegation of 15 Ainu arrived in China in February 1973, and spent three weeks 
observing Chinese policies toward minority populations. Both parties held the tour as a 
success, and three more delegations were sent to China in 1976, 1978, and 1983.132 
Ainu leaders also later sent delegations to Alaska, Canada, and Scandinavia to connect 
with other minority Indigenous populations.133 
 In addition to Ainu activities abroad, new domestic activities began to create 
social avenues for the dissemination of information pertaining to Ainu culture. These 
activities were part of an ongoing process of re-birth for Ainu ethnic identity that had 
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been lost through the generations of oppression.134 Most notably was the creation of the 
Poroto Kotan Ainu Museum in Shiraoi in 1976.135 Tourism revenues secured economic 
self-reliance for Ainu people, promoted an Ainu self-identity through the education of 
Japanese and international travelers. However, these methods were not without their 
critiques, particularly from those who felt the colonial nature of tourism overshadowed 
its benefits.136  
However, to present the domestic Ainu movement as wholly peaceful would be 
misleading. Some activists invoked public-shaming tactics to achieve broad media 
coverage, but further divided the national debate on Ainu rights. One example of these 
tactics used by activists included the interruption of a panel of Ainu studies experts 
during the 1972 annual meeting of the Japanese anthropological and ethnological 
societies.137 These were acceptable consequences for some Ainu rights activists that 
believed the actions were necessary to raise national awareness of the continued 
struggle for Ainu rights. However, dangerous actions were also taken in the name of 
Ainu liberation. A few non-Ainu detonated two bombs near the Asahikawa shrine in the 
name of Ainu Liberation on October 23, 1972.138 The Ainu community met this action 
with sharp criticism, and forty Ainu activists met in Asahikawa to protest the bombing 
and deny Ainu involvement.139 Additionally, the terrorist cell group “East-Asia Anti-
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Japan Armed Front” bombed the Hokkaido Government in 1976, the day after the 
anniversary of the 1899 Protection Act. Although no Ainu individuals or organizations 
were responsible for these attacks or other crimes, the fact that these actions were 
committed in the name of Ainu liberation led to the increased politicization of Ainu 
rights discourse.140 Japanese public opinion remained suspicious of any Ainu activities. 
 International delegations and domestic tourism indicated the activation of initial 
domestic-transnational links between the Ainu and international organizations. 
Additionally, the activation of domestic-transnational networks continued. Some of 
these include social ties with the Inuit of Canada and the United States, as well as other 
Indigenous populations that participated in the third World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples, and the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations.141 Strong Ainu 
connections with the United Nations would unfortunately not develop until the 1980s. 
Still, by the mid-1970s the Japanese government had already taken defensive measures 
to deny Ainu Indigeneity. These denials marked Japan’s entrance into Phase 2 of the 
spiral model.  
Phase 2: Denial - Mid-1970s to 1997 
 The transition between Phase 1 and Phase 2 is unique within my analysis 
because it is the only gradual transition. Japan’s denial of Indigenous rights began while 
human rights institutions, such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, were still under development. Once international institutions 
established a means to place a state on the international agenda for violation of 
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Indigenous rights norms, public scrutiny began to prompt the Japanese government to 
deny that the Ainu continued to exist as a separate people.142 
 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink state that in the denial phase “the norm-violating 
government refuses to accept the validity of international human rights norms 
themselves and that it opposes the suggestion that its national practices in this area are 
subject to international jurisdiction”143 At first glance, denials from the Japanese 
government seem inconsistent with the above definition. A majority of the Japanese 
government’s denials was not against the validity of Indigenous rights norms, but rather 
that no such Indigenous populations existed within Japan.144 Nevertheless, the 
foundational argument behind these denials remained the same. The fact that the state 
needed to deny the existence of the Ainu despite evidence to the contrary indicates that 
the socialization process had begun, meaning that the Japanese government has begun 
to interact and internalize aspects of Indigenous rights discourse.145 Were it not, the 
state would feel no pressure to deny these allegations. I divide my Phase 2 analysis into 
two subsections. First, I demonstrate the further strengthening of domestic-transnational 
ties, which also indicates the presence of the aforementioned “boomerang throws” 
between the Ainu Indigenous rights movement and international organizations. Then, I 
discuss the state’s public denials that were prompted by continuous social pressures 
caused by coordinated pressure from above and below. 
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(a) Continuous Cooperative Pressure 
 As mentioned earlier, initial domestic-transnational social ties for the Ainu first 
developed through Ainu delegations sent to other states with colonial histories. These 
delegations were tasked with creating a comparative legal analysis of foreign laws and 
their effects on the local Indigenous populations. If Ainu-China relations metaphorically 
opened the door for international Ainu activism, Ainu-Inuit relations in 1977 walked the 
Ainu through that door. Following an international convention in Japan sponsored by 
the International Whaling Commission, two Inuit leaders met with Ainu leaders in 
Nibutani.146 The meeting reinforced the importance of solidarity between Indigenous 
Peoples worldwide, prompting one Ainu leader to state “that there is no limit to what 
oppressed people can do when they meet and work together.”147 Ainu leaders thereby 
promised to continue relations with the Inuit and establish further connections with 
other Indigenous populations worldwide. An Ainu delegation to the Northern Slope 
Autonomous region was dispatched the following year.148 Thanks to the development of 
Ainu-Inuit relations, the first Ainu representative attended the third World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples in 1981.149 This event would prove indispensable toward Ainu 
international visibility.  
Ainu international involvement with the United Nations began at the fifth 
session of the Working Group of Indigenous Populations in 1987.150 It is worth noting 
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that Ainu involvement at a UN function is traceable to 1976. Then, a group of Ainu 
artists performed modern dramatizations of Ainu epics at a UNESCO cultural festival in 
Paris.151 However, the involvement of Ainu delegations in UN political discussions on 
Indigenous rights blossomed during the 1980s. Ainu political involvement with the UN 
exposed them to new international resources.152 One of those resources was 
International Labor Organization Convention no. 107 (C170), which Ainu leaders were 
unaware of until international working groups informed them.153 “As a result of the 
contact and travel, the more conservative Ainu leaders associated with the [Kyokai] 
came to embrace the nonassimilationist agenda.”154 In a statement on partial revisions to 
C170, the Kyokai declared that it opposed “any international convention of domestic 
law which holds an assimilationist program as its basic orientation.”155 
The Kyokai’s new position was undoubtedly clarified with the adoption of a 
1982 proposal declaring “that the Ainu, as the [I]ndigenous [P]eople of the disputed 
Northern Territories, possessed [I]ndigenous rights in the region and should be included 
in any discussions in the future.”156 
Despite the Ainu’s involvement in United Nations events, Ainu activists at home 
became frustrated by the high barriers of international involvement, particularly in 
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meeting the “challenges of available times, language ability, and expertise.”157 These 
struggles remain difficult to overcome, and often necessitate the usage of a “statesmen” 
class capable of connecting domestic voices to international listeners and vice-versa. 
Still, these channels provided effect means of change, albeit possibly slower than a 
scenario without these barriers. 
Coordinated pressure between the domestic Ainu movement and international 
organizations continued throughout the 1990s. In 1991, the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations held symposiums in Tokyo and Sapporo.158 In 1992, the 
Hokkaido Utari Kyokai Executive Director Giichi Nomura spoke as a representative of 
all Indigenous Peoples at the opening ceremony of the UN General Assembly’s “Year 
of Indigenous People.”159 In the conclusion of his speech, Nomura called for further 
Indigenous interdependency, stating the following:  
In this new era in which the world is grouping towards a redefinition of 
the international order following the end of the Cold War, we believe "a 
new partnership" of [I]ndigenous [P]eoples which includes this world 
view can make a lasting and valuable contribution to the global 
community. It is the desire of indigenous peoples to make the future, full 
of the hopes of all mankind, an even better place.160 
In less than a decade, the Ainu had developed from one of the newest Indigenous 
populations to enter the international activist arena into one of the leading Indigenous 
populations for change thanks largely to these domestic-transnational social ties 
established during the 1970s and 1980s.   
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(b) State Denial 
 As international visibility of the Ainu increased during this time, so too did the 
Japanese government’s denials of their continued existence. This was despite the fact 
that the Japanese government had ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1979. The 
surprising economic growth following World War II further entrenched ideals of 
Japanese uniqueness and homogeneity within Japanese politics. However, The Japanese 
government’s denial of the existence of minority populations in the late 1970s 
exemplified that the socialization process, which is the process in which international 
norms are internalized and implemented domestically, had begun to effect the Japanese 
government. 
 As the UN increased its efforts to promote international Indigenous rights, more 
attention shifted toward the Ainu.161 By the 1980s, the Japanese government argued that 
the Ainu were fully assimilated into Japanese society.162 In its first review under the 
Human Rights Committee in 1981, the Japanese government contended that they 
completely support minority rights, but no people or groups of people existed within 
Japan that met the ICCPR’s legal description.163 In response to the Committee’s 
concern, Japanese representatives clarified that Article 27’s protection of minorities was 
aimed at those that (1) differed from the general population ethnically, religiously, or 
culturally, and (2) could currently be differentiated from the general population from a 
historical, social, or cultural perspective.164 In explicitly addressing the Ainu, the 
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Japanese representative responded, “since the Meiji restoration in the [19th Century], 
establishment of a rapid communication system had made the difference in their way of 
life indiscernible. The [Ainu] were Japanese nationals and treated equally with other 
Japanese.”165 Similar questions and responses were also given during Japan’s second 
review with the Committee in 1988.166  
 Another example of state denial of Ainu existence made national headlines in 
1986. While addressing parliament, Prime Minister Nakasone stated that no racial 
minorities existed in Japan.167 This statement provoked outrage not only from the Ainu 
community, but other minority populations such as the local Korean and Chinese 
populations. Surprisingly, the Japanese government responded to this public outcry by 
backpedaling from this stance within domestic politics. However, the government 
continued to claim the lack of minorities in Japan until 1981. 
By 1993, the Japanese government recognized in its report to the Committee 
that the Ainu were indeed a minority population (not Indigenous) within the 
interpretation of Article 27 of the ICCPR. However, the state insisted that the Ainu had 
not been denied their right to their own religion, language, or culture because they are 
Japanese nationals.168 These denials would gradually weaken as Japan entered Phase 3 
of the spiral model in 1997. 
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Phase 3, Part I: Tactical Concessions – 1997 to 2008  
 I would like to preface this section by clarifying that Chapter II only contains the 
early stages of Japan’s Phase 3 analysis. This is because the latter half of Phase 3 is 
heavily related to the adoption of the DRIP and the perceived effects the document had 
in shifting Japan into Phase 4. Therefore, the full analysis of Phase 3 is divided between 
Chapters II and III. 
 The Japanese government’s denials of Ainu rights began to erode during the 
1990s. A state’s entrance into Phase 3 of the spiral model is evidenced through tactical 
concessions that create “cosmetic changes to pacify international criticisms.”169 
Although the 1990s witness a multitude of political changes for the benefit of the Ainu, 
none rivaled the importance of the repeal of the 1899 Protection Act. My analysis of 
Phase 3 begins with this repeal caused by two governmental actions: (1) the surprising 
court decision of Kayano et al. v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee, and (2) the 
adoption of the 1997 Promotion Act of Ainu Culture and Discrimination of Knowledge 
Regarding Ainu Traditions (1997 Promotion Act) as a tactical concession to 
international and domestic pressures.  
 I will first quickly introduce some of the domestic changes meant to appease the 
Ainu population preceding 1997. The Japanese government’s appeasement of Ainu 
frustrations actually began much earlier in the 20th Century. Early appeasements can be 
traced back to 1919 with the first revision of the 1899 Protection Act.170 The Act would 
be revised four more times (1937, 1946, 1947, and 1968) before its eventual repeal. 
However, these appeasements were miniscule in scope and did little to change the status 
                                            
169 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, 25. 
170 “Ainu Historical Events.” 
 51 
 
of the Ainu from “former aborigine.” These provisional appeasements continued the 
existence of “welfare colonialism” over the Ainu population.171 This later included the 
establishment of the Hokkaido Utari Welfare Policy in 1974, which sought to help Ainu 
economically without improving any cultural rights.172 
 The 1990s bore witness to a drastic change in Japan’s domestic human rights 
laws. Other domestic social movements continued to lobby the government for change, 
particularly the movements to advance women and children rights.173 By 2001, eight 
separate laws had been passed to address women and children issues.  
A similar pattern of domestic lobbying paired with continuous international 
pressures would eventually effectuate change for the Ainu. Shigeru Kayano became the 
first Ainu to sit as a member of the Diet in 1994.174 Within his first month in office, 
Kayano also became the first person to speak the native Ainu language on the Diet 
floor.175 In 1995, the Diet formed an Experts Meeting Concerning Ainu Affairs to 
consider a plan to replace the 1899 Protection Act.176 This plan was known as the draft 
Ainu New Law. It had been promoted by the Hokkaido Ainu Kyokai eleven years 
earlier, but the empowering of a new coalitional political party within the Diet allowed 
for further changes. However, as we shall see later, many aspects of the proposed Ainu 
New Law were omitted or weakened in the 1997 Promotion Act. 
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The events of 1997 hold the strongest evidence of Japan’s entrance into Phase 3 
of the spiral model. The Japanese government’s tactical concessions taken in response 
to exogenous and endogenous pressures empowered the domestic Ainu population 
while slightly easing international pressures. The actions of Japan’s judicial and 
legislative branches re-categorized the Ainu as a minority population owed special 
protections by the Japanese government.  
(a) Kayano et al. v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee 
 On March 27, 1997, The Sapporo District Court ruled in what quickly became 
one of the most influential court cases on Ainu rights. Despite the court’s ruling that no 
substantive relief could be granted, an alternative victory was won for the entire Ainu 
population.177 The following subsection details the facts of this case and its effect on 
Japan’s Ainu population. 
 Plans to build a dam over the Saru River in Nibutani village began in 1978, and 
a compulsory taking of the surrounding lands was issued by the Hokkaido government 
in 1986.178 For generations, the Ainu considered these surrounding lands and the river 
to be sacred.179 Many archeological items tied to Ainu history remained unearthed near 
the river. Additionally, Nibutani largely consisted of Ainu, who made up 70-80% of the 
population.180 In 1989, Shigeru Kayano (who would later become a Diet member) and 
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Kiichi Kaizawa filed an administrative appeal to halt production.181 As construction 
continued, both Kayano and Koichi Kaizawa (son of the then-deceased Kiichi) filed a 
suit with the Sapporo District Court in 1993.182 
 In a shocking decision, the court held that the Japanese government was bound 
under Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution and Article 27 of the ICCPR “to give due 
consideration to cultural interests of the minority Ainu people in carrying out its 
affairs.”183 More importantly, the court found that the Ainu were a minority aboriginal 
race, a major shift from the long-held title of “former aborigine.”184 It was thereby ruled 
that the Hokkaido government had illegally expropriated the land, but no injunction was 
grated and the land was not order to be returned because the construction of the dam 
had been completed.185 Still, the court’s decision set a new precedent for Ainu rights as 
a minority population, and received widespread national publicity.186  
 Since the court’s decision, further industrial development in the area has waned. 
The once-planned industrial sector never developed due to a lack of investment, and the 
dam can only supply electricity to the local population.187 Instead, the current primary 
purpose of the Nibutani dam is to supply agricultural waters to rice fields 
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downstream.188 Additionally, the dam has largely inhibited the migration path of 
Shishamo Salmon, which holds religious significance to Ainu culture.189 
(b) The 1997 Promotion Act 
 Less than two months after the decision of the Sapporo District Court, the 1899 
Protection Act was repealed and replaced with the 1997 Promotion Act. Although the 
1997 Promotion Act seemingly coincided with the judicial decision in Kayano et al., its 
initial drafting resulted from a 1996 report of the Advisory Committee on the Future 
Measures for Ainu People.190 This historic change in Japan’s legal policy exemplified 
Japanese tactical concessions to appease domestic and international pressures. Some 
aspects of the law were groundbreaking for Ainu recognition within Japan. It was the 
first law enacted in Japanese history to recognize the existence of a minority population 
in Japan.191 Furthermore, it promoted the restoration of Ainu lifestyle and culture 
through the preservation of Ainu oral traditions and constructive recreations of tradition 
Ainu houses, boats, and clothes.192 The 1997 Promotion Act defines Ainu Culture as 
“the Ainu language, cultural assets such as music, dance, handicraft or others that have 
been succeeded by the Ainu and cultural assets that have derived from the above.”193 
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The Japanese government assigned both the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, 
and Tourism (MITI) and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and 
Technology (MEXT) the duty of creating policies to promote Ainu culture.194 These 
two government organizations established the Foundation for Research and Promotion 
of Ainu Culture (FRPAC) in November to further enact the 1997 Promotion Act.195 A 
1999 supplementary provision to the 1997 Promotion Act would later explicitly state 
that the Government should also take appropriate measures to respect the ratification of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and 
the spirit of the UN Decade for Human Rights Education.196  
 Unfortunately, the flaws within the 1997 Promotion Act instead turned the 
perceived Ainu victory into a temporary bandage of tactical concessions. In comparison 
to the draft New Ainu Law previously promoted by the Hokkaido Utari Kyokai, the 
1997 Promotion Act “rejected all aspects . . . pertaining to the issues of self-
determination, special representation, access to natural resources, economic autonomy, 
and anti-discrimination, leaving only the thin crescent of cultural promotion and 
dissemination of information about the Ainu to the Wajin Japanese.”197 The law failed 
to fully recognizing Ainu Indigeneity and gave no assurance of whether special rights 
were guaranteed to the Ainu as a distinct ethnic group.198 These shortcomings 
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emphasized the tactical nature of the government’s concessions—that the Ainu were 
now a minority, but the laws that protected them remained fairly weak. 
 The 1997 Promotion Act remains good law within Japan. A recent 2016 anti-
hate speech law was passed to curb discrimination in Japan, but has largely been 
criticized as ineffective and too narrow in scope.199 The FRPAC continues to operate as 
a sponsor of Ainu annual events, such as the Ainu Cultural Festival, and acts as an 
educational organization to further promote Ainu culture throughout all provinces in 
Japan.200 This promotion has also expanded beyond Japan’s state borders. Thanks in 
part to the FRPAC, Ainu dancers have performed during a wide variety of ceremonies 
in the U.S., U.K, Finland, and other states.201 
(c) Continued Governmental Push-back 
 Phase 3 is rightfully labeled as one of the most precarious moments of the spiral 
model. Despite the aforementioned changes in domestic law, Japan internationally 
participated in “an awkward dance around the issue of Ainu indigenousness” during the 
decade following the enactment of the 1997 Promotion Act. Following the act’s 
adoption, many Ainu to a “wait and see” approach to the new changes being 
implemented.202 Meanwhile, the Japanese government continued to claim to 
international audiences that the Ainu were a completely assimilated population. This 
included the Japanese government’s first and second reports to the CERD Committee in 
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1999, and in 2001 before the Durban conference.203 The linguistic modus operandi for 
the Japanese government became to recognize that the Ainu were a minority population 
“indigenous to Hokkaido,” but not an Indigenous People for purposes of international 
law.204 Additionally, the Hokkaido High Court’s 2004 decision in Ogawa v. Hokkaido 
(Governor) weakened the pro-Ainu judicial analysis established in Kayano et al., and 
found that the management of Ainu communal property over the past century had been 
adequate despite the improper management resulting in substantial financial loss.205 The 
early 2000s quickly bore witness to a regression of newly established domestic Ainu 
rights. Had internal and external pressures been alleviated by the 1997 Promotion Act, 
continued decay of newly established Ainu rights might have caused Japan to regress 
back to Phases 1 or 2. 
Conclusion: No Phase Regression 
 Before the Japanese government could completely curtail the effects of Kayano 
et al., renewed international and domestic pressures would emerge in 2007 with the 
adoption of the DRIP. This is discussed in detail in Chapter III. However, in concluding 
part 1 of my Phase 3 analysis, I wish to draw attention to certain characteristics present 
within Japan’s particular case study scenario that prevented its regression to Phase 1 or 
2. First, domestic-transnational human rights networks remained active during this 
period, and Japan’s active membership in UN organs such as the Human Rights 
Committee, the Human Rights Council, and the CERD Committee continued to the 
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application of international pressures. Japan’s status as a transparent non-authoritarian 
state also prevented the state from enacting brutal methods to extinguish domestic Ainu 
demands or silence Ainu leaders. Finally, the Japanese government had become too 
embedded in the process of “self-entrapment,” where previous argumentative 
concessions begin to transform from instrument reasons to true dialogue.206 The 
Japanese government’s gradual belief of its own appeasing rhetoric is one factor that 
eventually forced the state into Phase 4 of the spiral model.  
 In summarizing Chapter II, the Ainu are evidenced as an Indigenous populations 
existing in northern Japan prior to Wajin occupation. However, Japan’s colonial control 
over the Ainu damaged the population’s cultural heritage. In phase 1, I exemplified how 
the growth of the domestic Ainu movement began to challenge the assimilatory 
repressiveness of the state promulgated by the 1899 Protection Act. Once domestic 
attempts were frustrated, the Ainu sought to obtain global support from international 
organizations and other Indigenous populations. As pressures intensified domestically 
and internationally, the Japanese government tactically repealed the 1899 Protection 
Act. However, the 1997 Promotion Act still failed to meet many of the needs of the 
Ainu, and did not recognize them as Indigenous under international standards. While 
the Japanese government awkwardly avoided the issue of Ainu Indigeneity over the 
next 10 years, multiple UN organizations continued to determine international standards 
for Indigenous rights. These UN organizations included the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations, the UN Economic and Social Council, and the Commission on 
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Human Rights.207 These international Indigenous rights standards would eventually be 
codified in the DRIP. Its influence in Japan are further discussed in Chapter III. 
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Chapter III: The DRIP’s Effect in Japan 
 As mentioned previously, the development of Indigenous Peoples rights is a 
recent phenomenon. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was a result 
of these new endeavors that codified the growing international norms. Less than one 
year later, the Ainu were officially recognized by the Diet as Indigenous by the 
Japanese government. 
 This chapter examines Japan within late-Phase 3 (tactical concessions) and 
Phase 4 (prescriptive status), and discusses what must be done for Japan to enter Phase 
5 (rule-consistent behavior) in the future. More specifically, I seek to explain how the 
DRIP could be utilized as an impetus for change to result in Japan’s internalization of 
Indigenous Peoples human rights norms. Since the Diet’s recognition of the Ainu in 
2008, the Japanese government has undergone rapid policy change to support Ainu 
cultural, economic, and social rights. Admittedly, governmental adaptation remains 
sluggish regarding the adoption of political developments, such as self-determination. 
To support my analysis that Japan is currently in the process of internalizing Indigenous 
norms while recognizing their validity, I will first detail the Japanese government’s 
interaction with the DRIP during the brief time between its adoption and the Diet’s 
recognition of the Ainu less than a year later. Next, I examine the Japanese 
government’s policies after 2008 for evidence that Japan’s internalization of 
international Indigenous rights norms has reached the prescriptive status of Phase 4. 
Finally, I discuss what steps should be taken in the near future if Japan is to reach Phase 
5, rule-consistent behavior. 
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Phase 3, Part II: Tactical Concessions - The DRIP and Its Effect 
 Recall that Phase 3 has been divided in order to highlight the DRIP’s adoption 
and its role in Japan’s eventual completion of Phase 3. We last left our discussion on 
Japanese Indigenous law with the establishment of Ainu minority rights by the Japanese 
judiciary in the case of Kayano et al. The case of Ogawa, which had found the Japanese 
government not liable for gross mismanagement of Ainu communal lands, along with 
other governmental actions began to expose the shortcomings of the 1997 Promotion 
Act, but domestic and international actors continued to be apply pressure on the 
Japanese government for substantive change in Ainu rights.  
 Surprisingly little readily-accessible information is available detailing the short 
time between the DRIP’s adoption in the UN General Assembly in 2007 and the Diet’s 
unanimous adoption of the “Resolution Calling for the Recognition of the Ainu People” 
as Indigenous in 2008. Some sources appear to treat the two events as inherently 
connected.208 The lack of focus on this detail perhaps signifies the obvious connection 
believed by most historians and Ainu scholars that the DRIP played an imperative 
role.209 Thus, it is important to establish why such connections between the two events 
are presumable. In doing so, I will also detail how the Japanese government began to 
engage in tactical concessions, as detailed in Phase 3 of the spiral model. 
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 Noting my reasoning from Chapter II why Japan’s internalization of Indigenous 
rights norms did not regress back to Phase 2 (continued social links, active international 
participation, and liberal transparency), scholars have also concluded that Japan’s “goal 
of becoming an important international leader ha[d] led it to embrace global norms that 
may clash with domestic priorities.”210 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink hint at the effects of 
such priorities where they state, “To the degree that a nation values its membership in 
an emerging community of liberal states, it will be more vulnerable to pressures than a 
state that does not value such membership.”211 The Japanese government’s desire to be 
a great player within the UN was an advantage for the Ainu when pushing for 
recognition.212 
 One case of international embarrassment for Japan occurred during 2006.  
Doudou Dienne’s (UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance) comments after his official visit 
in 2005 that “in Japan … there are no instruments that enforce the general principle of 
equality or offer sanctions against discriminatory acts committed by individuals, 
business, or NGOs.”213 Although the Japanese government did not explicitly deny 
Diene’s claim, they “complained to the Commission on Human Rights in 2006 that 
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Diene had made ‘many statements which were beyond the Special Rapporteur's 
mandate.’”214  
 Despite this embarrassment, the Japanese government had already to change its 
international rhetoric during the 2000s. The government’s international policy change 
on Indigenous rights was first exemplified by the Japanese government’s vote in favor 
of the revised draft edition of the DRIP in 2006. This decision was in spite of the 
Japanese government’s longstanding complaint that an objective definition of 
“Indigenous Peoples” was necessary for the declaration’s success.215 During continued 
DRIP considerations in 1995, the Japanese government stated the following:  
It cannot be meaningful to draft this declaration without clearly defining 
the term "indigenous populations" who are to be entitled to the rights 
listed in this instrument. Furthermore, using the term "indigenous 
populations" without establishing objective definitions would cause 
arbitrary interpretation and end up with confusion.216 
Additionally, Japanese representatives during the drafting of the DRIP cautioned other 
participants on creating strong provisions on land rights, political participation, and 
collective rights.217  
 Pressures that persuaded Japan’s vote during the 2006 draft discussion are noted 
in the decision-making process. Prior to the vote, a Japanese official noted that the state 
intended to abstain from the vote.218 However, prior to their decision, the Japanese 
representative in Geneva reported that two states who had indicated they would vote 
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against the draft, Canada and Russia, received strong criticism from the rest of the 
international community in Geneva.219 This stirred fears that the Japanese delegation 
could be “criticized from both sides” of the argument if they abstained.220 Therefore, 
evidence points to Japan as having reacted to pressures applied by international society 
to vote in favor of the 2006 draft DRIP resolution. “‘The representative to the United 
Nations in Geneva didn’t want Japan to be criticized by international society in the 
conference room’ and so persuaded Tokyo to vote for the resolution.”221 It is also 
important to note that the UN ECOSOC lists the Hokkaido Utari Kyoukai (listed as 
Ainu Association of Hokkaido) is one of seventeen organizations of Indigenous Peoples 
accredited as having observed and participated in DRIP negotiations.222  
 The Japanese government’s favorable vote for the draft DRIP resolution 
strongly exemplified a tactical concession that marks Phase 3. This was a strategic 
move by the Japanese government to lessen international isolationism, which Canada 
and Russia were facing because of their vote.223 These concessions by the Japanese 
government were arguably more beneficial for the Ainu than any prior concessions. The 
government also announced that the Ainu had not been recognized as an Indigenous 
People in 2006, but it was willing to recognize that the Ainu should participate in 
conferences about Indigenous Peoples’ rights.224 The Japanese government’s support of 
                                            
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
222 “Report of the Working Group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 (E/CN.4/2005/89/Add.1),” United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, accessed May 7, 2017. https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/113/03/PDF/G0511303.pdf?OpenElement. 
223 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, 25. 
224 Larson, Johnson, and Murphy, “Emerging Indigenous Governance: Ainu Rights at the Intersection of 
Global Norms and Domestic Institutions,” 68. 
 65 
 
Ainu participation in international dialogue further highlighted why the Japanese 
government hesitated to extend Indigenous title to the Ainu. A real concern existed in 
Japan that “recognition of the Ainu as [I]ndigenous would require recognition of 
expansive rights associated with self-determination, particularly concerning natural 
resources.”225 These concerns considered resource development and land disputes that 
were similarly echoed by the four states that would later vote against the DRIP’s 
adoption in 2007.226 However, the Japanese government did not abstain or vote against 
the 2006 draft DRIP or the DRIP’s adoption in 2007.227  
The international importance of the DRIP’s adoption for Indigenous Peoples 
was immediately apparent as a standard of norms for Indigenous cultural rights, land 
usage, and self-determination. It was an international non-binding declaration 
applicable to all states (unlike ILO C169) that reinforced popular Indigenous rights 
while also providing Indigenous communities with explicit materials to further pressure 
states to adopt rights that might remain controversial.228 For the Japanese government, it 
quickly became the topic of discussion for Ainu rights. 
Ainu community leaders and other pro-Ainu government leaders sought to 
capitalize on the international momentum of change for Indigenous Peoples after the 
DRIP’s adoption in 2007. They invited the Japanese government to join this wave of 
                                            
225 Ibid. 
226 Mieke Coppes, “Canada’s Acceptance of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Implications for the Inuit,” The Artic Institute (August 9, 2016), accessed April 10, 2017, 
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/canadas-acceptance-declaration-rights-indigenous-peoples/. 
227 Larson, Johnson, and Murphy, “Emerging Indigenous Governance: Ainu Rights at the Intersection of 
Global Norms and Domestic Institutions,” 67. 
228 Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self Determination, Culture and 
Land (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007), 30. 
 66 
 
change by developing a new comprehensive Ainu policy.229 In November 2007, 
Japanese Communist Party member Kami Tomoko demanded that the government 
recognize the Ainu as Indigenous Peoples in accordance with the DRIP.230 Likewise, 
the Hokkaido Utari Kyokai sent an official request that the government recognize them 
as Indigenous.231 Perhaps the key piece of the puzzle however, was the strategic 
placement of the Indigenous Peoples Summit in Ainu Mosir in July 2008. This event 
was sponsored by an Ainu-centric Steering Committee “outside of the government-
sanctioned networks of power such as the Ainu Association of Hokkaido.”232 
Additionally, the executive director for this event was Shimazaki Naomi, who would 
later serve as the first Ainu Minzokuto (Ainu Party) candidate in 2012.233 The 
Indigenous Peoples Summit preceded the 34th G8 summit by a mere three days, and 
would ultimately host around 1800 people, with 200-250 being Ainu.234 Japanese 
leaders feared further international criticism could stem from visible mobilization of 
domestic Ainu rights activists and preempted the predicament by recognizing the Ainu 
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as Indigenous.235 Thanks to these domestic and international activists empowered by the 
recent adoption of the DRIP, the Japanese government was placed in the ultimate hard 
spot, unable to avoid international criticism unless governmental action was taken to 
recognize the validity of Ainu Indigeneity.  
Upon foreseeing the unavoidable conflict, the Diet unanimously adopted a 
resolution urging government officials to officially recognize the Ainu on June 6, 
2008.236 The government’s response was affirmative. “The government will not only 
enhance the Ainu policies taken so far, but will also make efforts to establish 
comprehensive policy measures in recognition of the fact that the Ainu are an 
[I]ndigenous [P]eople with a unique language as well as religious and cultural 
distinctiveness.”237 
In order to not overshadow this pivotal through the over-emphasis of the spiral 
model, I wish to once again reframe this moment within the initial question of this 
project, which is “In what way has the DRIP acted as an impetus for change regarding 
Ainu rights in Japan?” The DRIP’s adoption empowered the domestic Ainu and pro- 
Ainu activists in two ways. First, it empowered them to petition the government for 
immediate change to recognize the Ainu as Indigenous Peoples of Japan.238 This is 
because the DRIP provided domestic activists a legal tool to work with that had already 
been publicly supported by the Japanese government at the UN General Assembly, one 
of the most important bodies in international relations. Second, the DRIP’s adoption 
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empowered a non-traditionally sanctioned Ainu organization to take advantage of the 
wave of international change through the Indigenous Peoples Summit.239 This action 
intertwined domestic and international pressures, and provided the Japanese 
government enough incentive to finally recognize the Ainu as Indigenous. 
This pivotal moment is where the Japanese government ceased its tactical 
concessions, and began to accept the validity of Indigenous norms. Risse, Ropp, and 
Sikkink argued that a principled idea gains “prescriptive status” under Phase 4 through 
a decisive process that creates a sustained impact for social and political change.240 
Unfortunately, this determination is somewhat dampened due to political rights 
restrictions that will be discussed in length during the next section. Nevertheless, most 
evidence suggests Indigenous norms had acquired prescriptive status in Japan following 
the recognition of the Ainu as an Indigenous People in 2008. 
Phase 4: Japan’s Prescriptive Status on Indigenous Rights – 2008 to Present 
Phase 4, prescriptive status, entails the state’s acceptance of the validity of 
international norms, and regular state involvement to comment on its own behavior.241 
Phase 4’s prescriptive status is a tricky phase to identify. On one hand, the state has 
taken great strides to change according to domestic and international pressures, 
including self-diagnosis of violations. However, the state’s behavior may continue to 
violate international norms at times. I divide my Phase 4 analysis into three subsections. 
First, I examine the Japanese government’s domestic policy changes since their 
recognition of Ainu Indigeneity in 2008. Next, I tie these changes to the four indicators 
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of prescriptive status described by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink: (1) ratification of human 
rights conventions, (2) institutionalization of norms in a state’s constitution and/or 
domestic law, (3) institutionalized methods to file individual complaints, and (4) 
discursive practices. While addressing these indicators, I also highlight specific areas 
that have not witnessed a full domestic implementation of the DRIP with regard to the 
Ainu. Finally, I specifically address the fourth indicator, discursive practices. In doing 
so, I address four criteria necessary to identify whether the aforementioned discursive 
practices are actually present in Japan. 
(a) Japanese Policy Changes Since 2008 
Despite the government’s decision to recognize the Ainu as an Indigenous 
People, confusion remained as to whether this definition was synonymous with the 
DRIP largely because the declaration lacked a clear definition.242 To solve this 
dilemma, the Japanese government organized the Advisory Council for Future Ainu 
Policy, consisting of eight experts. Their findings were published in the Advisory 
Council’s Final Report in July 2009. Based on the Advisory Council’s 
recommendations, the Japanese government adopted a Japan-specific definition for 
Ainu Indigeneity.243 This definition referred to the Ainu as “a minority people who were 
the first to settle in [a] certain part of the country, and deemed that if the state enters 
their territory without prior consent and adversely affects their culture under a national 
policy, then it has a grave responsibility to provide reparations for related damage.”244 
The Final Report called for the Japanese government to respect the DRIP “as a general 
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international guideline for [I]ndigenous policies.”245 However, enactment of the DRIP 
should also not overshadow the realities of conditions for many Ainu people and current 
conditions of the country.246  
This Japan-specific definition of Indigenous Peoples had two immediate 
consequences. First, this definition marked the introduction of international Indigenous 
Peoples norms into the Japanese legal system. The definition recognized that the DRIP 
held a significant role in shaping how Japan’s future Ainu policy should proceed. 
Second, it limited the DRIP’s influence to social, cultural, and economic aspects of 
Ainu rights. Other rights, such as self-determination and land rights, would remain 
absent under the Japanese definition of Indigenous People.247 
Following the recommendations of the Advisory Council, the Secretariat 
Cabinet established a permanent advisory body for Ainu policy, the Ainu Policy 
Promotion Council. The Promotion Council consisted of 14 council seats with 5 of them 
reserved for Ainu representatives.248 Multiple projects have since been assigned by the 
Japanese government to the Promotion Council. These projects contain a wide breadth 
of topics such as cultural initiatives, educational reformation, repatriation of ancestral 
remains, measurements of Ainu economic and social livelihood, hate-speech against 
Ainu, and awareness campaigns through tourism and multimedia.  
One specific project set to open in 2020 is the “Symbolic Space for Ethnic 
Harmony,” a national institution designed to educate visitors about Ainu livelihood and 
                                            
245 Advisory Council for Future Ainu Policy, “Final Report, Provisional Translation,” in The Ainu: 
Indigenous People of Japan Vol. 3, ed. Henry Stewart (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Center for Ainu and 
Indigenous Studies, 2012), 21. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Tsunemoto, “Toward Ainu- and Japan-Specific Indigenous Policies,” 45. 
248 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA 2010), “Japan,” 303. 
 71 
 
history from the perspective of the Ainu. The Symbolic Space is currently being built in 
the traditional Ainu village of Shiraoi. The development of this area was one of the 
primary recommendations attached to the Final Report in 2009 as an area “where Ainu 
and other Japanese people can learn together about the history and culture of the Ainu 
so that related information can be passed on to future generations.”249 Additionally, to 
increase Ainu ownership and legitimacy of the Symbolic Space, the initially planning 
included interviews with both experts and young Ainu individuals. 250 The Symbolic 
Space is scheduled to open before the 2020 Tokyo Olympics in order to maximize its 
international publicity.251 
Additionally, the Symbolic Space holds a secondary purpose as a repository for 
the eventual repatriation of ancestral remains and funerary items. Past misguided 
attempts to study Ainu anatomy resulted in Japanese universities collecting over 1,600 
Ainu remains.252 Most of these remains do not have identified lineal descendants, are 
dismembered and stored separately, and/or suffer from poor university bookkeeping. 
Repatriation has become a dividing issue within Ainu communities, particularly around 
means of restoring the dignity of those Ainu remains once held in mass storage.253 A 
number of Ainu individuals would rather see remains returned to local Ainu 
organizations for reburial and funerary, but universities with large Ainu remains 
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collections, such as Hokkaido University, cited government guidelines that act as 
barriers to these efforts.254 Despite the polarizing effect of repatriation, the Symbolic 
Space’s plans for these remains hopes to prove to the Ainu community that Ainu 
remains can be treated with reverence.   
Avenues of Ainu ancestral repatriation will hopefully continue to expand with 
the building of the Symbolic Space. For now, two recent effective repatriation examples 
have proven successful. First, a court-mediated settlement between a small group of 
Ainu descendants from Urakawa, Hokkaido, and Hokkaido University in July 2016 saw 
the repatriation of twelve Ainu remains that had been confiscated nearly eighty years 
prior. 255 More recently, the Urahoro Ainu Association and Hokkaido University also 
came to an agreement in March 2017. This agreement saw the return of seventy-six sets 
of Ainu remains to descendants, and the University shouldered the costs of 
transportation and reburial. 256 
(b) Four Indicators of Prescriptive Status 
To determine whether Phase 4 conditions were met in Japan, it is first pertinent 
to list the four indicators of prescriptive status identified by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink. 
These four indicators are as follows:  
(1) they ratify the respective international human rights conventions 
including the optional protocols;  
(2) the norms are institutionalized in the constitution and/or domestic 
law;  
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(3) there is some institutionalized mechanism for citizens to complain 
about human rights violations; and 
(4) the discursive practices of the government acknowledge the validity 
of the human rights norms irrespective of the (domestic or 
international) audience, no longer denounce criticism as “interference 
in internal affairs,” and engage in a dialogue with their critics.257 
Keep in mind that the “true beliefs” held by the Japanese government are not relevant to 
this determination. Rather, consistency between verbal promises and state actions are the 
main focal point of Phase 4. 
 I narrowly tailored my analysis of the first prescriptive status indicator toward 
conventions relatable to Indigenous Peoples. The DRIP is currently the only universally 
acknowledged international document pertaining to Indigenous rights. Despite the 
DRIP’s status as a non-binding declaration, we can still identify important elements of 
Japanese support, namely through a positive vote in favor of its adoption by the UN 
General Assembly. Likewise, the Japanese government’s vote in favor of the 2006 draft 
DRIP further supports this argument. In a broader scope, Japan is also a party to most 
major international human rights treaties. Although the Japanese government has not 
ratified all of these international treaties or their optional protocols, Japan is a party to 
those that relate to Indigenous Peoples. This includes the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). 
Regarding the second indicator, current constitutional interpretations 
demonstrate the institutionalization process currently taking place within Japan. This 
process is particularly strong with regard to Ainu cultural and economic rights. Article 
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13 of Japan’s Constitution establishes as a fundamental principle to respect the identity 
of the Ainu.258 Article 13 states the following:  
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not 
interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in 
legislation and in other governmental affairs.259 
The Advisory Council specifically addressed this constitutional tie as a vehicle for 
future Ainu policy. “If an Ainu individual willingly chooses to live with the identity of 
an Ainu, with different culture from many other Japanese, his/her choice should not be 
unjustly hindered by the government or any other individual.”260 In order to meet this 
constitutional standard, the Advisory Council strongly recommended bridging the 
historical economical and educational gaps between the Ainu and other Japanese, while 
also taking measures to respect the cultural diversity of the Ainu. This cultural respect 
included, but was not limited to, the ability for Ainu to practice their traditional 
language and religious beliefs.261 Utilizing the 1997 Promotion Act and the DRIP, the 
Japanese government seeks to adjust domestic law to reflect these constitutional 
responsibilities. Although these actions largely reflect what the 1997 Promotion Act 
was initially intended to provide, the DRIP’s addition provides an international legal 
basis to these claims, and solidifies Ainu Indigenous rights claims while providing a 
basis for future negotiations regarding self-determination. 
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 One large question remains regarding the second indicator within the Japanese 
context. Why has the Japanese government failed to enforce the Ainu’s right to self-
determination, along with other political rights reflected in multiple articles of the 
DRIP? Part of this is because the concept of self-determination remains undefined. 
However, this is also because of the contested nature of these ideas within Japanese 
society. Ainu are considered Japanese citizens with access to similar civil and political 
rights as the majority Japanese population. However, current policymakers in Japan 
contend that the nuanced historical relations between the Ainu and the Wajin have led 
to multiple inhibiting factors for Ainu-specific political rights. One such factor is the 
Ainu’s traditional autonomous element, or lack thereof. Unlike many Native American 
tribes, the Ainu lacked a sovereign tribal structure that could negotiate as a 
representative of all Ainu with the Japanese government.262 This is due in part to the 
fact that the Ainu were never a clearly defined state that could negotiate treaties as 
equal with other states, unlike many Native American tribes that hold a long history of 
treaty negotiations. Another factor includes the hesitance of many modern Ainu to 
claim their ancestry. Decades of assimilation resulted in strong social discrimination 
against the Ainu within Wajin society.263 Such discriminatory thinking continues to be 
rectified within the public sphere, but its effects are nonetheless a real concern for many 
of Ainu ancestry.  
 Finally, the constitutional anchor for Ainu rights under Article 13 fails to 
account for collective rights. Although individual rights are protected, property law and 
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political rights largely reflect Western ideals that are not conducive to the collective.264 
This is a problem that other states, such as the U.S., continue to struggle with. The 
Japanese government first hopes to revive Ainu cultural pride that may encourage more 
to reclaim their Ainu ancestry. A rekindling of Ainu culture identity might be able to 
bring about a stronger Ainu collective identity that can then be imbued with certain 
political rights in accordance with the DRIP. Until then, policy implementation 
regarding Ainu self-determination will remain difficult. 
The third indicator identifies how the Ainu can report Indigenous rights 
violations. I have already demonstrated through the cases of Kayano et al. and Ogawa 
that individual Ainu are welcome to bring their issues to court for judicial intervention. 
The DRIP and the 1997 Promotion Act thereby plays an important role in judicial 
decision-making to rectify these violations against individual Ainu. Beyond normal 
court proceedings, local Ainu organizations can raise specific issues to Working Groups 
that provide multiple reports to the Promotion Council throughout the year.265 
(c) Discursive Practices as Indicators of Prescriptive Status 
The last indicator of prescriptive status focuses on the Japanese government’s 
current “discursive practices.” Discursive practices are essentially a measurement of the 
state’s internalization of international norms displayed through the state’s day-to-day 
discourse. It is important that the Japanese government begins to “walk and talk” like 
other states that have already internalized Indigenous norms. In order to identify that 
these discursive practices are met by the state, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink adopted four 
                                            
264 Ibid., 48. 
265 “About the Council,” Council For Ainu Policy Promotion, accessed April 10, 2017, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ainusuishin/index_e.html. 
 77 
 
criteria. These criteria are (1) argumentative consistency, (2) adherence to norm 
validity, (3) reaction to criticism, and (4) matched deeds.266 
First, “argumentative consistency” is important when recognizing the claims of 
normative ideas.267 This means that the Japanese government’s dialogue on Indigenous 
rights should not substantially differ between audiences, particularly between the 
domestic and international arenas. Previous examples mentioned in Chapter II illustrate 
that this was not always the case prior to 2008.  
The Japanese government has emphasized domestically and internationally its 
recent efforts to promote the Ainu culturally, educationally, and economically. The 
Japanese government’s recent reports to the CERD reiterated these policies. In 2010, 
the Japan representative reported the following to the CERD: 
The human rights organs of the Ministry of Justice have expanded and 
strengthened their promotion activities to spread and enhance the idea of 
respect for human rights with a view to realizing a society where the 
dignity of the Ainu people is fully respected by eliminating prejudice and 
discrimination against the Ainu people while disseminating and 
deepening correct knowledge and understanding of the unique culture 
and traditions of the Ainu people.268 
Likewise, the Japanese government reported to the CERD similar policy approaches in 
2014, and introduced the Working Group for the “Symbolic Space for Ethnic Harmony 
and the Working Group for the “research on living Conditions of Ainu Peoples outside 
Hokkaido.”269 Additionally, Domestic consistency is visible through the “Irankarapte 
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campaign.”270 The campaign promotes Ainu culture through several media routes, 
including banners, signs, and online advertisements.271 
Second, discursive practices should continue to “adhere to the validity of the 
norm” despite a decrease in pressures or changes in state leadership.272 This standard is 
more telling for states that have recently changed from authoritarianism to liberal 
regimes. Still, party-control shifts in Japan’s Diet offers a comparable analogy. Despite 
the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) loss to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 
2009 from a lower house election, national policies to promote Ainu culture remained 
enforced.273 This election ended 54 consecutive years of control by the LDP.274 The 
Ainu did not lose their newfound recognition due to this political party transition. The 
same remains true after the 2012 election, when the LDP regained control of the Diet.275 
The LDP has since remained in control of the Diet.  
Third, in areas where the Japanese government continues to exhibit 
inconsistencies with Indigenous norms, how does the government react to criticism?276 
Recall from Chapter II that before the DRIP’s adoption, the government’s common 
response to international critiques was to claim that Japan was a homogenous state and 
that the Ainu were fully integrated into Japanese society. Such governmental reactions 
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are no longer the case. Instead, the Japanese government recognizes the continued 
existence of the Ainu and the duties owed to them as an Indigenous minority. Although 
international criticism against the government’s Ainu policy has tapered since 2008, 
where criticisms have persisted the Japanese government has engaged in dialogue with 
critics.277  
Fourth, Japan must enforce the Indigenous rights responsibilities it has assumed 
during international dialogue through domestic action. States are expected to implement 
“a sustained effort to improve the human rights condition.”278 Sustained effort plays a 
key role in a state’s eventual introduction into Phase 5 of the spiral model. Since 2008, 
the Japanese government has enacted a variety of changes to promote Ainu culture. 
Those that have been discussed previously include the creation of the Symbolic Space 
for Ethnic Harmony, the research of living conditions for Ainu people, and the current 
addressment of Ainu ancestral repatriation. Likewise, the Japanese government in 
tandem with multiple Ainu organizations create the Irankarapte campaign to further 
popularize and promote Ainu culture.279 In the realm of education, the Japanese 
government has implemented a scholarship program for high school and university 
Ainu students under the Second Promotion Policy for the Improvement of the Ainu 
People’s Life (2008).280  
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Still, recent concerns have been raised over the Japanese government’s 
willingness to provide sustained efforts to enforce Ainu Indigenous rights. One major 
concern is Japan’s governmental guidelines for 2016 junior high history textbooks. 
These revisions replaced key phrases such as “expropriation of land from the Ainu 
people” to “giving land to the Ainu people.”281 In response to criticism from Ainu 
activists, the government responded that the “defects in the passage have been 
resolved,” but further information toward these corrections has yet to be reported.282  
Additionally, hate speech in response to Ainu promotion has become a greater 
concern, particularly cyber hate-speech. Anti-Ainu Twitter posts from Sapporo City 
Assemblyman Kaneko Yasuyuki in 2014 and Hokkaido prefectural legislator Onodera 
Masaru in 2015 were met with harsh criticism by Japanese civil society.283 Despite both 
individuals failure in their reelection bids in 2015, their actions highlight a growing 
wave of anti-Ainu and anti-minority sentiments in Japan. 
When viewing its discursive practices in totality, Japan offers a mixed bag of 
successes and disappointments. In many ways, the Japanese government has 
successfully “talked-the-talk” as an international participant in Indigenous human 
rights. The Japanese government has ratified most the relevant international treaties and 
participated in dialogue with majority human rights bodies such as the CERD and the 
ICESCR Committee. However, most of the Japanese government’s implemented 
changes have focused on Ainu cultural rights, and even those policies have faced 
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domestic pushback. The eventual opening of the Symbolic Space for Ethnic Harmony 
will be a telling factor for how the Japanese government’s policy of Ainu cultural 
promotion will proceed in the future. 
In light of the multiple variables of this Phase 4 analysis, I would place Japan in 
the early stages of this phase. This is despite nearly a decade of development since 
Japan’s entrance into prescriptive status of its Indigenous rights policies. The Japanese 
government’s sudden recognition of the Ainu appeared to indicate that further 
internalization of Indigenous norms would be swift, but the government’s actions since 
then demonstrate a slower methodical approach. The Japanese government has certainly 
shown that it is willing to internalize certain aspects of Indigenous human rights norms 
that are easier to implement, such as cultural promotion. Within those limits, the 
Japanese government has taken strides to improve Ainu livelihood through economic 
incentives and educational support. The DRIP’s role in Japanese society as a reference 
tool has furthered these efforts and provided legal standards for cultural protection and 
promotion.  
However, the state’s inability to provide the Ainu with land rights and political 
rights is a significant barrier for full norm integration. Furthermore, recent concerns of 
sustained effort by the Japanese government present a possible path for future phase 
regression. Although Phase 4 expectations largely emphasize the role of communicative 
behavior between the Japanese government and domestic Ainu organizations, both 
domestic and international activists must continue to apply pressure to decrease the 
chances of phase regression 
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Phase 5: What Changes are Necessary for Rule-Consistent Behavior? 
 Having roughly located Japan’s current position within the spiral model at the 
beginning of Phase 4, I now consider what future changes are still essential for Japan to 
fully internalize international Indigenous norms. In doing so, I also wish to stress the 
important role that domestic-transnational social networks will continue to play if Japan 
hopes to achieve Phase 5 rule consistent behavior. Recall that Phase 5 goes beyond the 
acceptance of valid human rights norms. Phase 5 should encompass the full 
internalization of international norms through institutionalization and habitualization.284 
Additionally, this phase can prove exceedingly difficult for a state to enter and remain 
in once international limelight is transferred to other areas of importance.  
 Some required changes have been thoroughly discussed during my Phase 4 
analysis. Self-determination, land rights, and other political rights included in the DRIP 
are key elements of international Indigenous rights norms that remain absent in Japan. 
While the contextual argument for and against these rights was detailed earlier, the 
simple fact remains that these are currently internationally recognized as key concepts 
within Indigenous rights. So long as these elements are absent, it is hard to argue that 
the Japanese government is exuding rule-consistent behavior. Additionally, present 
concerns regarding hate-speech and historical revisionism must be addressed. These are 
red flags that could inhibit Japan’s progression in the future. 
 The Ainu will unfortunately continue to face racial prejudice for some time. 
Because the dominant actors for Phases 4 and 5 are national governments and domestic 
society, it is imperative that domestic Ainu associations avoid scandals and other 
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actions that belittle the cohesiveness and trust currently being built between the Ainu 
and non-Ainu communities. An audit of the Hokkaido Ainu Kyokai in 2012 uncovered 
misappropriation of funds that resulted in heavy reputational damage.285 The fallout of 
this issue resulted in the resignation of several top leaders, reorganization of multiple 
branch offices of the Kyokai, and a significant loss of funding for Ainu language 
curricula.286 Additionally, since the specific fault in this scenario dealt with money, the 
scandal further emboldened holders of long-held racial biases that Ainu lack mental 
insight, mathematical skills, and are easily swindled.287As Japanese society changes, 
Ainu associations will continue to be highly scrutinized, and therefore most avoid 
presenting opportunities that can be utilized to empower prejudices. 
 Assuming that all of the above changes are eventually implemented, other 
resources and activities could further support a future transition into Phase 5 for Japan. 
Successful opening of the Symbolic Space for Ethnic Harmony and continued changes 
in pro-Ainu repatriation law are strong starting points that could open more 
opportunities for dialogue. The Symbolic Space’s opening near the 2020 Tokyo 
Olympics will hopefully increase international publicity for the Ainu and offer a strong 
future support system from transnational actors. 
 Finally, it is important to understand the Japanese government’s Indigenous 
policies beyond the scope of the Ainu. Specifically, I am referring to the government’s 
policies with the Indigenous Okinawans. Despite the DRIP’s adoption and domestic 
activism, the Okinawans remain a population that has yet to be recognized by the 
                                            
285 Lewallen, The Fabric of Indigeneity: Ainu Identity, Gender, and Settler Colonialism in Japan, 219. 
286 Ibid., 220. 
287 Ibid., 219. 
 84 
 
Japanese government as Indigenous. Okinawan domestic-transnational networks are 
rapidly expanding, and Okinawans are becoming stronger actors within the international 
arena. In 2014, Okinawans joined the Ainu in the first U.N. Indigenous Peoples 
Conference despite their lack of recognition.288 The Okinawan Indigenous rights 
movement has gained momentum since the Ainu’s official recognition in 2008.289 Still, 
the Okinawans face a hurdle absent in the case of the Ainu- the presence of U.S. 
military bases for national security. Understandably, an entirely separate spiral model 
analysis could be developed detailing the Okinawan Indigenous rights experience thus 
far. However, for sake of brevity I wish to only bring to light the continued 
complexities of Japan’s internalization of Indigenous norms. For Japan to successfully 
enter Phase 5 of the spiral model, serious issues must be addressed by the government 
to apply these norms to all of its Indigenous populations, not just the Ainu. 
Conclusion 
 I have discussed how the DRIP has possibly played a significant role in Japan’s 
internalization of international Indigenous rights norms. The DRIP’s adoption near the 
end of Phase 3 prevented further phase regression and reinvigorated domestic and 
international Ainu activists. The Japanese government’s eventual acceptance of Ainu 
Indigeneity shows how these pressures can influence domestic policies. However, more 
work is necessary to push Japan into Phase 5. Current domestic laws focus specifically 
on cultural revivification while leaving out other political rights enclosed in the DRIP. 
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Perhaps a certain amount of reformation and education is necessary within Japanese 
society before the Ainu can be granted these rights. Assuming that current plans 
remobilize a number of the Ainu population that has hidden away their cultural heritage, 
incorporation of Ainu political rights could become a much easier task. These rights and 
the continued problems of racial biases are areas that domestic-transnational social 
networks can continue to provide support and pressure points for change. 
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Conclusion 
 This project has shown that some progression within the context of Ainu rights 
is attributable to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The DRIP’s 
adoption in 2007 provided a codified document of internationally recognized norms for 
pro-Ainu parties to draw upon, and further strengthened socio-political pressures from 
above and below that were already established. Therefore, the DRIP acted as an impetus 
for change within the context of Ainu-Japan relations. 
 Utilizing the five-phase spiral model as an explanatory and conceptual 
framework for the internalization of Indigenous rights, I have shown how the Japanese 
government’s domestic policy has developed since the end of World War II. The spiral 
model bridges the gaps between the two most popular perspectives for Indigenous rights 
development—social movements and the legalist rational model. To do this, it positions 
actions from domestic and international actors as cooperative pressures for policy 
change. The more a state seeks to protect its international reputation, the more these 
cooperative pressures will influence domestic Indigenous policies. 
 Phase 1, repression and the activation of social networks, began with the 
liberalization of the Japanese state following World War II. Two factors characterized 
Phase 1: (a) Ainu activists were at the time too weak to present a significant challenge 
to the Japanese government, and (b) domestic-transnational networks were eventually 
activated which allowed the Ainu to appeal to an international audience. The 
continuation of the 1899 Protection Act continued a policy of assimilation and 
discrimination against the Ainu during this period. Ainu activism increased during the 
1960s, but domestic avenues of remedy proved limited. The 1970s bore witness to a 
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shift in global thought regarding Indigenous rights. The emergence of the human rights 
movement during this time motivated the Ainu to begin to look abroad to other 
Indigenous Peoples for support, starting first with minority populations in China. This, 
along with the emergence of new domestic avenues to disseminate information 
provided a process of re-birth for Ainu culture that had largely been lost. 
 Phase 2, denial, began during the mid-1970s and continued until 1997. While 
the Japanese government did not deny the validity of Indigenous rights, they did deny 
that any such populations existed in Japan. Two factors were identifiable during this 
phase: (a) domestic-transnational social ties strengthen which allowed activists to apply 
continuous cooperative pressure against the Japanese government, and (b) the Japanese 
government began responding to this pressure by denying that the Ainu continued to 
exist. The Ainu continued to connect with other Indigenous minority populations such 
as the Inuit, but also became active participants in international Indigenous discourse. 
This included participation in UN symposiums and other functions that drew further 
scrutiny toward Japan’s denials. These denials began to recede during the 1990s. 
 Phase 3, tactical concessions, began during 1997 and ended with the Japanese 
government’s recognition of the Ainu in 2008. Japanese tactical concessions during the 
late-1990s sought to appease the Ainu minority. Two major examples of this 
appeasement process occurred at the beginning of Phase 3: (a) the case of Kayano et al. 
v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee, and (b) the revocation of the 1899 Protection 
Act for the 1997 Promotion Act. The judge in Kayano et al. held that the Ainu were a 
minority population with a right to special protections from the Japanese government. 
Less than two months after this decision, the 1997 Promotion Act replaced the long-
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standing 1899 Protection Act. Despite these changes, the government attempted to 
curtail these changes during the early- to mid- 2000s. The DRIP’s adoption 
reinvigorated Ainu activism, and the Japanese government formally recognized the 
Ainu as Indigenous on June 6, 2008. This moved Japan into Phase 4 of the spiral model. 
 Phase 4, prescriptive status, is where Japan currently resides within the spiral 
model. Although Japan continues to violate some Indigenous norms, the government 
has largely accepted that these norms are valid. Likewise, the state can self-diagnose its 
current shortcomings. In this phase, I addressed Japanese Ainu policies since the Ainu 
were recognized. This included the development of a Japan-specific definition of 
Indigenous Peoples that focused largely on cultural, educational, and economic 
empowerment of Ainu people. Additionally, the Japanese government created the 
Advisory Council to address Ainu needs, and the Symbolic Space for Ethnic Harmony 
will open in 2020. Still, Ainu land rights, self-determination, and other political rights 
are still not available at this time. Due to these limitations, I hesitated to place Japan any 
farther than the earlier stages of Phase 4. 
 Phase 5, rule-consistent behavior, has yet to be achieved by Japan. In order to 
enter this phase, the Japanese government must be willing to adopt Indigenous norms in 
their entirety, including those mentioned previously that remain unavailable. Phase 5 
requires full institutionalization and habitualization of these norms. Since trust between 
the Ainu and Japanese society are still developing, it is imperative that domestic Ainu 
associations avoid scandalous behavior. They are representatives of the Ainu people 
domestically and internationally. Likewise, international activists should continue to 
apply pressure for complete change. In a broader perspective, similar policy 
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development is necessary regarding the Okinawans, who remain unrecognized by the 
Japanese government. For both the Ainu and the Okinawans, further integration of the 
DRIP within Japanese domestic law can aide Japan toward an eventual transition into 
Phase 5. 
Alternative Explanation 
 There is one notable alternative explanation to this model of interpretation 
regarding Ainu Indigenous rights in Japan. This alternative explanation considers the 
World Bank, the World Trade Center, and other economic international organizations 
that incentivize the development of human rights through financial loans to states. This 
model on norm internalization is based on international economic incentives from a top-
down perspective. State actors may have to meet “good governance” criteria included in 
such loans that could enact further liberalizing measures.290 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 
argue that the effects of international financial institutions are already included within 
the spiral model as part of the transnational human rights network.291 Additionally, the 
WTO has played an important role at the intersection of Indigenous rights and 
intellectual property rights. This explanation could provide further understanding as to 
how Ainu rights have developed in Japan through international influences, but most 
likely will not consider the role of domestic actors within the norm internalization 
process. 
 In most examples of Japanese international relations, another explanation would 
be available—the role of the U.S. as a leading ally. U.S.-Japan relations have stayed 
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closely connected since the end of World War II in many areas such as national defense 
and economics. However, as we have seen during the UN General Assembly’s adoption 
of the DRIP, the U.S. voted against its adoption before eventually adopting it at a later 
date. Conversely, Japan voted in favor of the DRIP and began discussing its effect on 
domestic law immediately. This decision by the Japanese government to vote in favor 
of the DRIP despite the U.S.’s hesitation severely weakens the argument that the 
Japanese government was acting in step with its ally. 
Japan, International Norms, and the Future of Indigenous Rights  
 In light of this spiral model analysis, I have offered evidence as to how the DRIP 
may have influenced the Ainu’s recognition as an Indigenous People. Starting with the 
Japanese government’s tactical concessions during Phase 3, I established that the 
Japanese government had continued to argue against the idea that the Ainu were 
Indigenous, but rather were a minority population. However, the Japanese government 
has continued to participate as a great player in the UN increased the state’s 
vulnerability to domestic-transnational social pressures. The effect of these domestic-
transnational pressures first became apparent with the Japanese government’s 
supporting vote for the 2006 draft DRIP, despite its initial desires to abstain. Facing 
similar conditions, the Japanese government also voted in favor of the DRIP’s adoption 
in 2007 by the UN General Assembly. Shortly thereafter, the Ainu invited the Japanese 
government to adopt many principles of the DRIP. The Japanese government’s decision 
to finally recognize the Ainu as Indigenous peoples stemmed partially from the 
popularity of the newly adopted DRIP, and the utilization of domestic-transnational 
social ties to potentially highlight continued discrepancies between the government’s 
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Indigenous standards and international standards. This was done through the strategic 
placement of the Indigenous Peoples Summit in Ainu Mosir by the IPS Steering 
Committee a mere three days before the 34th G8 summit.  
 The Japanese government’s recognition of the Ainu prior to these two summits 
not only allowed Japan to avoid the potential international criticism, but also altered the 
political narrative that the government was successfully adapting international standards 
for Indigenous rights recently codified in the DRIP. This propelled Japan into Phase 4, 
prescriptive status. Although the government still has not fully integrated the DRIP’s 
standard into domestic law, policy changes since 2008 have demonstrated that the 
Japanese government remains serious in its responsibility to promote and revive Ainu 
culture. These changes include the Japanese government’s development of the 
Promotion Council, scholarship offers, the Symbolic Space for Ethnic Harmony, the 
Irankarapte promotional campaign, and the current redress of repatriation methods for 
Ainu ancestral remains. 
 We must also ask ourselves why Japan’s internalization of Indigenous rights 
norms is important to our greater understanding of international norms. From what this 
analysis has shown, moderate change in domestic policies to adopt international 
standards need not have binding force. In recalling the example of ILO C169, we know 
that having states ratify binding treaties on Indigenous rights remains an extremely high 
bar. Finding an alternative route for change is significant. Domestic and international 
activists can successfully utilize non-binding international documents to provide 
cooperative pressure for change. To support this theory, I have demonstrated the 
gradual transformation of Japan, a state that once publicly prided itself on homogeneity, 
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but now seeks to enforce international Indigenous standards with the Ainu. 
Additionally, keep in mind that this change occurred without the support of four 
traditionally liberal actors with large Indigenous populations: the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  
 This project also demonstrates when internalization of Indigenous rights is more 
likely. Cultural and educational rights for Indigenous Peoples appear to be easier for 
states to implement, and may tend to be some of the first major changes in domestic 
law. However, land rights, self-determination, and other political rights may remain 
controversial as Indigenous Peoples rights continue to develop. This may remain an 
issue, particularly for states with property rights that focus on individual ownership. The 
future of Indigenous Peoples rights may see a two-step process in states that are 
unwilling or cannot implement the full spectrum of Indigenous Peoples rights. Cultural 
and educational rights might be able to act as an initial agent for change to create 
awareness outside of the Indigenous population and further support of Indigenous 
rights. However, the opposite may be true if states remain unwilling to implement a 
second round of Indigenous rights for political representation. Wide-scale indifference 
to Indigenous self-determination could have damaging consequences to Indigenous 
rights norms despite the DRIP’s influence. Domestic and transitional actors have a 
significant responsibility to continue to pressure states governments to accept 
Indigenous rights in total. 
 Advocates for Indigenous Peoples rights should bear in mind the spiral model 
when pressuring states for policy change. They need to encourage the Indigenous 
population to actively participate in international Indigenous forums, and strengthen 
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domestic-transnational social ties the violating state can face international scrutiny. 
Domestic and international actors can wield the DRIP as a codified example of 
international Indigenous norms to pressure a violating state into international 
conformity. While this social process does not guarantee that a state will adopt 
international Indigenous norms, it does offer itself as a peaceful method of change 
supported by international society. The Ainu have successfully worked alongside the 
international community to bring about domestic changes in Japanese Ainu policy. 
Indigenous rights will continue to develop as more Indigenous Peoples activate 
domestic-transnational ties with the international community. Activists should further 
seek to connect these communities as a social network of support for Indigenous 
Peoples. 
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